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A key question at the intersection of state and federal law is whether corpo-
rations can use their charters or bylaws to restrict securities litigation to federal
court. In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court answered this question
in the negative in the landmark decision Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg. The court
invalidated “federal forum provisions” (“FFPs”) that allow companies to select
federal district courts as the exclusive venue for claims brought under the Secur-
ities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The decision held that the internal affairs doc-
trine, which is the bedrock of U.S. corporate law, does not permit charter and
bylaw provisions that restrict rights under federal law. In March 2020, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court overturned the Chancery’s decision in Salzberg v.
Sciabacucchi, holding that in addition to “internal” affairs, charters and bylaws
can regulate “intra-corporate” affairs, including choosing the forum for Securi-
ties Act claims.
This Article presents the first empirical analysis of federal forum provi-
sions. Using a hand-collected data set, we examine the patterns of adoption of
such provisions and the characteristics of adopting firms. We show that adoption
rates are higher for firms with characteristics, such as belonging to a particular
industry, that make them more vulnerable to claims under the 1933 Act. We also
show that adoption rates substantially increased after the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Cyan Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, which validated
concurrent jurisdiction for both federal and state courts for 1933 Act claims. We
also find that the firms that adopt FFPs at the initial public offering (“IPO”)
stage tend to share characteristics that have been associated with relatively
good corporate governance. To assess the impact of the Sciabacucchi decision,
we also conduct an event study. We find that the decision is associated with a
large negative stock price effect for companies that had FFPs in their charters
or bylaws. The effect is robust even for firms that had better governance fea-
tures, that underpriced their stock at the IPOs, and whose stock price traded at
or above the IPO price prior to the Sciabacucchi decision.
In light of the empirical findings suggesting that federal forum provisions
may serve shareholders’ interests by mitigating excessive 1933 Act litigation, we
consider alternative legal theories for validating federal forum provisions in
corporate charters and bylaws. We suggest two possible approaches: (1) al-
lowing corporate charters and bylaws to address matters that are technically
external but deal with the “affairs” of the corporation; and (2) adopting a more
“flexible” internal affairs doctrine that could view 1933 Act claims as being
“internal” to a corporation’s affairs. The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision
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can be viewed as being more consistent with the first, rather than the second,
approach. We examine the possible implications of adopting either approach,
particularly with respect to mandatory arbitration provisions and the existing
Delaware statute on exclusive forum provisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Should a company be allowed to dictate the forum in which its share-
holders can bring suit? This has been one of the most vexing and controver-
sial issues in corporate and securities law in recent years. Proponents argue
that a large fraction of shareholder lawsuits against corporations (or their
directors and officers) lack merit, or are even frivolous, and the lawyers
representing shareholders (especially in class actions) often engage in forum
shopping simply to maximize their chances of success.1 Allowing the corpo-
ration to dictate the forum, possibly even using a mandatory arbitration pro-
vision, would help curb the abusive shareholder lawsuits and bring sanity
back to the system.2 Opponents, on the other hand, argue that depriving
shareholders of the right to bring suit—especially class action suits—in the
forum they choose can substantially curtail, or even deny, a fundamental
1 See, e.g., Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 467 (2014); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991).
2 See Hal Scott, Shareholder Deserve Right to Choose Mandatory Arbitration, CLS BLUE
SKY BLOG (Aug. 21, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/08/21/shareholders-de-
serve-right-to-choose-mandatory-arbitration/ (discussing SEC Commissioner Piwowar’s re-
mark that the US public companies “can come to [the SEC] to ask for relief to put . . .
mandatory arbitration into their charters”).
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right given to shareholders and can worsen the agency problem between
managers and shareholders.3
At least with respect to lawsuits based on corporate law and for corpo-
rations incorporated in Delaware, the issue seems fairly well settled. In the
2013 case Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., the
Delaware Chancery Court ruled that, as long as a corporation’s charter al-
lows the directors to unilaterally amend its bylaws, the directors can exercise
that right to unilaterally include an exclusive forum clause.4 In 2015, the
Delaware legislature amended the Delaware General Corporate Law
(“DGCL”) to expressly allow corporations to have a forum selection clause
in their charters or bylaws.5 A key element of the decision and the statutory
amendment is that forum selection for claims under states’ corporate law is
governed by the internal affairs doctrine. That doctrine states that only one
state—the state of incorporation—has authority to regulate a corporation’s
internal affairs, and according to Boilermakers, those internal affairs include
the forum for litigating claims under the state’s corporate law.
Forum selection with respect to federal securities lawsuits, on the other
hand, is more controversial. An important debate has taken place over
whether corporations can dictate in their charters and bylaws the forum for
lawsuits based on federal securities laws. One plausible argument is that the
internal affairs doctrine regulates only claims that arise under state law and
does not extend to rights under federal law. On the other hand, it is difficult
to ascertain a clear substantive distinction between shareholder lawsuits
under state corporate law and similar lawsuits under federal law. Both fed-
eral and state lawsuits often raise similar issues (such as disclosure and vot-
ing rights issues) and relate to the rights and powers of shareholders.6 A
3 See Ann Lipton, Locked Out: The Carlyle Group Tries to Bar Investors from Court,
ADVOCATE FOR INST. INV. Summer 2012, at 4, 6–7 (citing, for instance, how arbitration tends
to favor corporations over individual investors).
4 Boilermakers Loc. 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch.
2013). In upholding such a bylaw, the court applied the “contractarian” approach. According
to the court, “the bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a Delaware corpora-
tion and its stockholders,” and when the right to amend the bylaws has been granted to the
directors, the shareholders “will be bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally by their boards.” Id.
at 955–56. Almost all public corporations incorporated in Delaware have a charter provision
that grants bylaw modification rights to their directors. See Albert H. Choi & Geeyoung Min,
Contractarian Theory and Unilateral Bylaw Amendments, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2018).
5 See 8 DEL. CODE ANN., §§109, 115 (2018).
6 We do not discuss the broader question of whether the charter and bylaws should be
permitted to regulate matters that go beyond the internal or intra-corporate affairs, as this
requires a more detailed reexamination of Boilermakers which is beyond the scope of this
Article. Naturally, if shareholders and the company entered into a shareholders’ agreement that
specifies a forum for federal securities lawsuits, there would be little doubt that courts would
enforce it. See Bonanno v. VTB Holdings, Inc., No. 10681-VCN, 2016 WL 614412, at *15
(Del. Ch. 2016); Germaninvestments AG v. Allomet Corp., No. 2018-0666-JRS, 2019 WL
2236844, at *10 (Del. Ch. 2019), rev’d on other grounds (“Stockholders can expressly waive
Delaware venue in a contract between stockholders and the corporation”). Recently, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the argument that such contractual ar-
rangements (using shareholders’ agreements) would frustrate the purpose of DGCL §115, since
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more flexible internal affairs doctrine would deal with the matters that are
“internal” to the corporation, without making a formalistic distinction based
on whether a claim is based on federal or state law.
Although forum selection for federal securities lawsuits remained un-
settled, since 2017, a growing number of firms have pushed the envelope by
adopting exclusive federal forum provisions (“FFPs”) that seek to constrain
shareholders by only allowing federal law claims under the Securities Act of
1933 (“1933 Act”) to be brought in federal court.7 The 1933 Act, which
governs claims for material misstatements or omissions in initial public of-
ferings (“IPOs”), specifically commits jurisdiction over these claims to both
state and federal courts. FFPs were adopted in high-profile initial public of-
ferings, such as that of Snap, Inc., with the specific goal of restricting law-
suits for material misstatements or omissions in the IPO documents to
federal courts. Furthermore, as the Article shows, the rate of adoptions of
these FFPs significantly accelerated following the 2018 Supreme Court deci-
sion Cyan v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund,8 which expressly
validated the plaintiffs’ right to bring 1933 Act lawsuits in state courts.
But what about the validity of FFPs in charters and bylaws? The answer
was given several months later. In Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg,9 decided on
December 19, 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court held that a company’s
charter and bylaws cannot dictate the forum in which the shareholders may
bring a federal claim.10 The court reasoned that a corporation’s organizational
documents can only address internal corporate affairs, and that claims under
federal law exceed the legal bounds of the corporation’s organizational docu-
ments.11 Thus, under the Chancery Court’s reasoning, the internal affairs doc-
trine does not encompass state law provisions that regulate rights under
federal law. Thus, while Cyan made the adoption of FFPs more attractive,
Sciabacucchi took away that option. On March 18, 2020, however, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court overturned the Chancery Court’s decision in Salzberg v.
Sciabacucchi.12 The Supreme Court focused heavily on the statutory lan-
guage of DGCL §102(b) and made a distinction between internal versus in-
“Delaware corporations could simply eliminate Delaware as a choice of forum with mandatory
forum selection clauses” outside charters and bylaws. However, since the Supreme Court de-
cided that case on other grounds, it declined to resolve this important question. See
Germaninvestments AG v. Allomet Corp., No. 291, 2020 WL 414426, at *21 (Del. 2020). At
any rate, such agreements are likely impractical in the context of public issuance of shares to
dispersed shareholders.
7 See infra fig. 1 (showing how increasing numbers of IPO companies have adopted fed-
eral forum provisions since 2017).
8 Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Emp. Retirement Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).
9 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 578, at *3 (2018).
10 According to the court, a claim based on a federal securities law is an “external” claim
(a claim that resides outside of the boundaries of corporate law), and a corporate document,
such as a certificate of incorporation or bylaws, cannot regulate such a claim. Id. at *41.
11 See id. at *3 (“The constitutive documents of a Delaware corporation cannot bind a
plaintiff to a particular forum when the claim does not involve rights or relationships that were
established by or under Delaware’s corporate law.”).
12 See Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 2020 Del. LEXIS 100 (Del. 2020).
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tra-corporate affairs. Based on the statutory language, the Court ruled that
charters and bylaws can regulate intra-corporate affairs, including claims
based on the federal Securities Act.
In the midst of this back-and-forth, some important policy questions
remained unanswered. Should companies be allowed to have an FFP in ei-
ther their charter or bylaws? How important is an FFP for a company? Why
would some companies utilize them while others do not? So far there has
been no systematic investigation of how widespread or how important FFPs
are, and this Article attempts to fill that gap. Through an empirical analysis,
it takes a closer look at the use of FFPs in companies’ organizational docu-
ments and evaluates the impact of the Chancery Court’s decision
(Sciabacucchi case) on shareholder value. The Article makes several impor-
tant findings.
First, using hand-collected data, we document the adoption of FFPs
since 2017 and analyze the characteristics of firms that adopted such provi-
sions. FFPs were adopted mainly after the Cyan decision by firms that are
undergoing IPOs and that are more likely to be the target of lawsuits under
the 1933 Act. More specifically, they more likely belong to industries, such
as computer software and pharmaceuticals, that have traditionally been more
vulnerable to federal securities lawsuits. In addition, they tend to raise larger
proceeds in their IPOs, yet exhibit negative earnings, which suggests that
their valuations are based on uncertain future growth. Nonetheless, we do
not find that these firms exhibit characteristics that arguably reflect greater
agency problems, such as dual-class structures.13 To the contrary, these IPOs
tend to be backed by venture capital and private equity firms, which are
typically associated with better governance structures at the IPO stage (such
as more independent boards).14 Moreover, these firms tend to underprice
their IPOs, meaning that their stock prices exhibit a larger increase on the
first day of trading. This evidence suggests that these firms are seeking to
reduce the risk of litigation, and that the investors in these IPOs are less
likely to suffer a loss.
Second, to answer the question of whether the FFPs matter and, if so,
how much, we conduct an event study of the Sciabacucchi decision to evalu-
ate its impact on the value of the firms with FFPs. We find that the decision
13 Dual-class stock companies, such as Google and Facebook, are companies with two or
more classes of shares with different voting rights. Typically, one class of shares has more than
50 percent of the voting rights, but substantially lower cash flow rights. This creates the risk
that the controller will manage the firm to benefit itself at the expense of other shareholders.
For discussion of dual-class structures, see, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis et al., Agency Problems at
Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697 (2009); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils
of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 GEO. L.J. 1453 (2019); Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Own-
ership and Long-Term Shareholder Value, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53 (2018); Zohar Goshen &
Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,125 YALE. L. J. 560 (2016).
14 This is consistent with a study that shows that companies that adopted exclusive forum
clauses in their bylaws had better corporate governance features than nonadopters. See Roberta
Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation,
14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 66–71 (2017).
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is associated with a large negative stock price effect.15 Moreover, this effect
exists even if we limit the analysis to firms that belong to industries that are
vulnerable to federal securities lawsuits; to firms that adopted the provision
in their charters (as opposed to the bylaws), thereby making it harder for
shareholders to amend the provision; and to firms that are less vulnerable to
agency costs by excluding firms that have a dual-class stock structure.
To be sure, the negative shock around the Sciabacucchi decision does
not necessarily mean that FFPs are beneficial to shareholders. First, as is
applicable to all event studies, there may be intervening events around the
decision that may have contributed to the result. Second, the decline in stock
prices may reflect the higher likelihood that firms will have to pay larger
amounts in future settlements (or judgments) rather than the desirability of
these provisions. Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that our results do
reflect, at least to some extent, investors’ overall view of the decision. As we
explain below, the recovery amounts in these lawsuits are unlikely to exceed
the negative effect associated with the decision. Moreover, this negative ef-
fect is robust even if we evaluate only firms that are less likely to pay large
amounts in settlements, firms that underpriced their stocks at the IPO, and
firms whose stocks traded at above the IPO price just before the
Sciabacucchi decision.
Taken together, our findings are consistent with a growing line of re-
search that points to the excessive costs and distorted incentives that underlie
forum shopping by plaintiffs.16 Foremost, the findings support reforming the
1933 Act to require the filing of claims only in federal courts, consistent
with its twin act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which governs fraud
in the secondary market. They also suggest that there are good reasons to
reconsider the merits of the Sciabacucchi decision and validate FFPs in cor-
porate charters and bylaws. While we agree that the legal basis underlying
Sciabacucchi is sensible, we offer a few alternative approaches to reading
the Delaware statute and interpreting the case law. The first alternative ap-
proach would allow charters and bylaws to deal with matters, such as 1933
Act claims, that may be viewed as being technically “external” but still
15 This is consistent with a recent study that finds that forum selection clauses increase
firm value by reducing the probability of multijurisdictional litigation. See Jared I. Wilson, The
Consequences of Limiting Shareholder Litigation: Evidence from Exclusive Forum Provisions
(July 10, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2646312). While our hope is to be able to conduct some additional empirical studies (includ-
ing an event study) based on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision, because the decision
came down in the middle of the coronavirus pandemic and extremely high stock market vola-
tility, we are skeptical that any meaningful event study can be conducted based on the Su-
preme Court’s decision.
16 See, e.g., Ofer Eldar & Neel U. Sukhatme, Will Delaware Be Different? An Empirical
Study of TC Heartland and the Shift to Defendant Choice of Venue, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 101
(2018); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2016); Elisa-
beth Kempf & Oliver Spalt, Litigating Innovation: Evidence from Securities Class Action
Lawsuits (European Corp. Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 614/2019, 2019), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3143690.
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dealing with the “affairs” or “intra-corporate affairs” of the corporation and
the “rights” of the stockholders. This is the approach largely adopted by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Salzberg.
While making the distinction between intra-corporate versus internal
affairs may be sensible, that is not the only way to allow charters and bylaws
to choose the forum for federal Securities Act claims. The second approach
would argue for a more “flexible” internal affairs doctrine so as to encom-
pass matters that intimately relate to the rights of the shareholders, including
the right to bring a 1933 Act claim. We discuss the legal basis for each
alternative and potential implications of adopting one over the other. We
also argue that validating FFPs does not necessarily, at least as a matter of
policy, imply the validation of more controversial provisions, particularly
mandatory (individual) arbitration provisions that can potentially deny
shareholders the right to sue under the 1933 Act altogether. After all, even
when FFPs are enforced, shareholders are still free to bring their 1933 Act
claims in federal court, either individually or as a class action. At the same
time, as we explain below, expanding the sphere of internal affairs (the sec-
ond approach) means that blocking mandatory arbitration and fee-shifting
clauses would be statutorily mandated, whereas under the first approach, that
door remains open.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses in more detail the
history of forum selection in securities class action lawsuits. Part II explains
the importance of FFPs by describing the differences in litigating cases in
federal courts versus state courts. Part III begins the empirical analysis by
examining the characteristics of firms that adopt FFPs. Part IV conducts an
event study of the Sciabacucchi decision. Part V discusses the implications
of the empirical findings for assessing FFPs and the Sciabacucchi decision.
Part VI reconsiders the legal basis of Sciabacucchi and offers a few alterna-
tive legal theories for validating FFPs, including the approach taken by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Salzberg.
I. THE HISTORY OF FORUM SELECTION IN SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS
Congress passed two prominent statutes after the Great Depression: the
Securities Act of 193317 (“1933 Act”) and the Securities and Exchange Act
of 193418 (“1934 Act”). While there is much complexity and overlap, the
1933 Act largely deals with the types of information a company must dis-
close to its prospective investors when issuing new securities, such as at an
initial public offering (“IPO”), at a secondary offering, or in the context of a
merger. Thus, it governs claims primarily alleging misstatements and omis-
sions in disclosure materials relating to offerings of securities. Specifically,
17 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018).
18 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2018).
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Section 11 of the 1933 Act governs material omissions and misstatements in
a company’s registration statement,19 and Section 12 imposes liability for
selling unregistered securities, failing to follow the SEC’s “gun jumping”
rules, and making material misstatements or omissions in prospectuses.20
The 1934 Act, on the other hand, deals with fraud in transactions on the
secondary market, including misstatements in “periodic” and other disclo-
sures, proxy statements for shareholder meetings, and liability for insider
trading (under Rule 10b-5).21
With respect to shareholder lawsuits that are based on the 1934 Act, the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.22 If certain plaintiff-shareholders
are alleging a material misstatement or omission in a corporation’s proxy
statement or insider trading, for instance, they must bring the case, individu-
ally or as a class, in federal court.23 Shareholder lawsuits brought under the
1933 Act, on the other hand, are a different matter. Unlike the 1934 Act,
federal and state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction over 1933 Act
claims from the time of its enactment.24 If plaintiff-shareholders want to
bring a material misstatement or an omission claim based on a company’s
IPO documents (such as its S-1 registration statement or prospectus), they
can do so in either federal or state court.
Much has changed, however, since the enactment of the 1933 Act.
Leading up to the 1990s, Congress became increasingly concerned with the
impact of securities class actions, particularly the abundance of frivolous
lawsuits brought by plaintiffs’ lawyers in the hope of extracting settlements
for meritless but expensive claims.25 In response, Congress enacted the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”),26 which imposed many
restrictions on securities class actions brought in federal courts. Key among
these were a stay imposed on discovery prior to decisions on motions to
dismiss, restrictions on lead plaintiffs, and potentially higher pleading stan-
dards. We further discuss the import of these restrictions in Part II.
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018). A Section 11 plaintiff recovers the “excess” price she paid
for a share because of a material misstatement or omission in the issuer’s registration state-
ment. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2018).
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 77l (2018). See generally Steven Thel, Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act: Does Old Legislation Matter?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183 (1995).
21 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975).
22 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2018); see also Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Emp. Ret. Fund, 138 S.
Ct. 1061, 1073 (2018).
23 See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 245 n.2 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2018).
25 See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 785–86
(8th ed. 2017); see also Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor
Grundfests’ “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission’s Authority”, HARV. L. REV. 438 (1994); Private Securities Litigation, Staff Re-
port, Senate Subcommittee on Securities of the Comm. On Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (May 17, 1994).
26 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
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Faced with these restraints, plaintiffs’ lawyers sought creative ways to
circumvent them. One primary means was by bringing securities class ac-
tions under “blue sky” state law in state courts (as a substitute to claims
under the 1934 Act),27 where the strictures of the PSLRA did not apparently
apply.28 Observing the flight of securities class actions to state courts, Con-
gress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”) in
1998.29 SLUSA provided for the removal of state securities law class actions
to federal court, and then for their dismissal.30
However, although the purpose of SLUSA was to bring securities class
actions back within the ambit of the federal courts (and thus within the re-
strictions of the PSLRA),31 SLUSA did not address class actions brought
solely under the 1933 Act. Could such class actions still be brought in state
court, even though this would permit the end-run around the PSLRA that
SLUSA was designed to prevent? For nearly twenty years, courts across the
country split on the issue. The Ninth Circuit permitted 1933 Act claims to be
remanded to state courts, notwithstanding SLUSA.32 Other district courts,33
particularly those of the Second Circuit, the “mother circuit” for securities
litigation,34 held that 1933 Act claims in state court were precluded by
SLUSA.
Largely in response to this jurisdictional uncertainty and the alleged
abuse by plaintiff-shareholders (and plaintiffs’ lawyers) in bringing federal
IPO-related claims in state courts,35 a number of companies began experi-
menting with exclusive forum provisions in their IPO documents.36 The first
series of attempts centered on including mandatory arbitration clauses in
charters. This effort was led by the Carlyle Group, a private equity company,
27 “Blue sky” laws are specialized state statutes that govern securities sales. See generally
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347
(1991).
28 See Klausner et al., infra note 45, at 3–6. The differences between securities litigation in R
federal and state courts are discussed in Part II.
29 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
30 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2018).
31 See, e.g., Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 636 (2006); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006).
32 See, e.g., Elec. Workers Local 357 Pension and Health & Welfare Tr. v. Clovis Oncol-
ogy, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2016); W. Va. Laborers Trust Fund v. STEC Inc.,
No. 11-01171-JVS (MLGx), 2011 WL 6156945 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011).
33 See, e.g., Iron Workers Dist. Council of New England Pension Fund v. MoneyGram
Int’l, Inc., No. 15-402-LPS, 2016 WL 4585975 (D. Del. Sept. 2, 2016); Gaynor v. Miller, et al.,
No. 3:15-cv-545-TAV-CCS, 2016 WL 6078340 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2016).
34 See, e.g., Hung v. iDreamsky Tech. Ltd., No. 15-CV-2514 (JPO), 2016 WL 299034, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2016).
35 See Nicki Locker & Laurie Smilan, Saying So Long to State Court Securities Litigation,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (2019) (“Securities class action plain-
tiffs have achieved a much higher rate of success in surviving threshold motions in IPO-related
federal securities class actions litigated in state courts, extracting significant settlements out of
proportion to results typically achieved in federal fora.”).
36 See infra Part III (providing an empirical account of IPO firms’ experimentation with
federal forum provisions).
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when it was offering its limited partnership shares to the public. Due in part
to the public backlash against the proposal and the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (“SEC”) unwillingness to accommodate, however, the Car-
lyle Group dropped the proposal.37 However, the debate on mandatory arbi-
tration provisions lives on.38
A more successful attempt—the main focus of this Article—was the
adoption of federal forum provisions (“FFPs”) in a company’s charter or
bylaws. Most notably, the first FFP in the organizational documents of an
IPO firm was by Snap, Inc. in February 2017. Snap’s charter designated fed-
eral district courts in any state as the exclusive forum for claims brought
under the 1933 Act.39 Unlike the mandatory individual arbitration clause,
which prohibited shareholders from even filing a class action suit, a typical
FFP merely prohibits plaintiff-shareholders from bringing an IPO-related
1933 Act claim in state court. That is, plaintiff-shareholders are free to bring
a class or an individual action, so long as the action is filed in federal court.
An important implication of requiring plaintiff-shareholders to file in a
federal court, of course, is that they will be subject to various requirements
of the PSLRA.40 A large number of companies with FFPs went through the
IPO process, or issued securities after a merger, without any major challenge
or backlash from the investors or the SEC.41 However, the legality of FFPs,
and the question of whether a court would uphold them, remained unsettled
until very recently.
In 2018, the Supreme Court resolved the jurisdictional uncertainty re-
garding 1933 Act claims. In Cyan v. Beaver County Employees Retirement
Fund,42 the Supreme Court construed SLUSA narrowly, stating that while
SLUSA prevented private plaintiffs from bringing claims under the 1934
37 Kevin Roose, Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause from IPO Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2012, https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-drops-arbitration-clause-from-i-p-o-
plans/. Professor Davidoff described Carlyle Group’s proposal as “the most shareholder-un-
friendly corporate governance structure in modern history . . . The effect is to essentially
eliminate any ability of shareholders to sue the board for even the most egregious acts.” See
Lipton, supra note 3, at 7. In response to the proposal, three U.S. Senators sent a letter to the R
SEC chairman, requesting that the commission deny the proposal. See Letter from Franken,
Blumenthal, and Menendez, U.S. Senators, to Mary Schapiro, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
(Feb. 3, 2012).
38 See Scott, supra note 2. R
39 See Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 43 (Feb. 2, 2017); Ann Lipton, And
Now for Something Completely Different about Snap and Shareholder Rights, BUS. LAW PROF-
BLOG. (Apr. 15, 2017), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2017/04/and-now-for-
something-completely-different-about-snap-and-shareholder-rights.html.
40 It should be noted that as discussed in Part II, some state judges have held that PLSRA’s
discovery stay applies in both state and federal courts, preserving one of the act’s primary
protections for securities defendants. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. R
41 See Cydney Posner, COOLEY, Will the Delaware Supreme Court Revive Exclusive Fed-
eral Forum Provisions for ’33 Act Claims? (Jan. 9, 2020), https://cooleypubco.com/2020/01/
09/will-delaware-revive-exclusive-federal-forum-provisions/ (“FFPs have been described in
dozens of registration statements, but the SEC has never challenged the validity of these provi-
sions or raised the question to the Delaware courts for determination.”).
42 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).
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Act under state law, it did not take away state courts’ power to hear claims
under the 1933 Act.43 Furthermore, according to the Court, SLUSA did not
allow the defendants to remove a properly filed state court claim to a federal
court.44 That is, once a 1933 Act lawsuit has been filed in a state court, it is
extremely difficult to move that lawsuit to a federal court without the plain-
tiff’s consent.
Cyan sparked two major developments in a very short period of time.
The first was a dramatic increase in 1933 Act claims filed in state courts, for
which there was often a parallel case brought in federal court against the
same defendant based on the same allegations.45 The second was the prolifer-
ation of FFPs, particularly in IPOs. As we document below, the proportion
of IPOs that included FFPs more than doubled almost immediately after
Cyan, and continued increasing in the following months. FFPs, therefore,
were responding to plaintiffs possibly choosing their favored venue of state,
rather than federal, court. The FFPs, in some sense, “flipped the table,” al-
lowing corporate defendants to preemptively dictate the venue even before a
1933 Act lawsuit was filed.46
The question remained, however, as to whether courts would respect
FFPs. The answer was given several months later. In December 2018, the
Delaware Chancery Court held in Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg that a company’s
organizational documents, i.e. its charter and the bylaws, cannot dictate the
forum in which the shareholders may bring a federal claim.47 The court
based its decision on its interpretation of the proper scope of the internal
affairs doctrine: “the state of incorporation cannot use corporate law to regu-
late the corporation’s external relationships.”48 According to the court, a
claim based on a federal securities law is an “external” claim (a claim that
resides outside of the boundaries of corporate law), and a corporate docu-
43 The central question in Cyan was whether SLUSA’s provisions stripping state courts of
jurisdiction over “covered class actions” extended to all lawsuits filed on behalf of fifty or
more people. Justice Kagan’s opinion held that SLUSA only stripped state courts of covered
class actions based on state law. See id. at 1069–71. The unanimous Court held that SLUSA
“says nothing, and so does nothing, to deprive state courts of jurisdiction over class actions
based on federal law.” Id. at 1069. Therefore, state courts continue to have concurrent jurisdic-
tion over class actions based on the 1933 Act.
44 Id. at 1078.
45 See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limits of Delaware Corporate Law: Internal Affairs, Fed-
eral Forum Provisions, and Sciabacucchi, 75 BUS. LAW. 1319 (2020). Notably, the article
documents a notable rise in the D&O insurance premium, which also covers liability based on
federal securities laws. Id. at 20–23. See generally Michael Klausner et al., State Section 11
Litigation in the Post-Cyan Environment (Jun. 28, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3411861).
46 Cf. Eldar & Sukhatme, supra note 16 (exploring a similar role reversal caused by the R
Supreme Court’s TC Heartland case, which shifted venue choice in patent infringement cases
from plaintiffs to corporate defendants).
47 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, 204 A.3d 841 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018).
48 Id. at *20.
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ment, such as a certificate of incorporation or bylaws, cannot regulate such a
claim.49
Unsurprisingly, as we show below, the decision led to a substantial
slowdown in the adoption of FFPs, and some companies have even issued a
special 8-K to investors in order to inform the market about the invalidity of
the provision. In some cases, companies issuing an 8-K promised to amend
their charter or bylaws (as applicable) if the decision is not reversed by the
Delaware Supreme Court.50 On the other hand, other IPO companies, such as
Lyft, adopted an FFP in their charter despite the decision, possibly in the
hope that Sciabacucchi would be reversed.51
In March 2020, perhaps fulfilling their expectations, the Delaware Su-
preme Court did just that in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi.52 The Court focused
heavily on the statutory language of DGCL §102(b), which allows corpora-
tions to include matters relating to the “affairs of the corporation” and pro-
visions that “create[ ], define[ ], limit[ ] and regulate[ ] the powers of the
corporation, the directors, and the stockholders” in their charters. By con-
trasting this language with that of DGCL §115, which prohibits non-Dela-
ware forum provision with respect to “internal affairs,” the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the matters that relate to stockholders’ right to sue
under the federal Securities Act, while not part of a corporation’s internal
affairs, can be classified as “intra-corporate” affairs and, therefore, can be
regulated through charters and bylaws.
II. WHAT IS AT STAKE? THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LAWSUITS IN
FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE COURTS
It is important to recall that FFPs do not prohibit filing lawsuits; they
only require plaintiff-shareholders to file their claim in federal court. Thus, it
may be argued that Sciabacucchi does not matter much because all it means
is that IPO firms will be sued in state courts instead of federal courts. How-
ever, due to the different procedural rules, whether a firm is sued in federal
court or in state court can matter a great deal for the outcome of a case.
There are four main differences between lawsuits in federal and state courts.
First, in federal court, the PSLRA dictates that discovery is stayed until
after the motion to dismiss is decided.53 This procedural rule spares defend-
ants the cost of discovery in lawsuits that are dismissed, and imposes on
plaintiffs the costs of obtaining detailed information without the benefits of
49 Id. at *1.
50 See, e.g., Surface Oncology, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 13, 2019) (“In the
event that the Delaware Supreme Court affirms the Court of Chancery’s Sciabacucchi decision
or otherwise makes a determination that provisions such as the Federal Forum Provision are
invalid, the Company’s Board of Directors intends to amend promptly the Company’s Bylaws
to remove the Federal Forum Provision.”).
51 See Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 60 (Mar. 1, 2019).
52 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 2020 Del. LEXIS 100 (Del. 2020).
53 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b) (2018). See Klausner et al., supra note 45, at 5. R
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discovery. To be sure, some states have adopted discovery rules that resem-
ble those of the PSLRA. Recently, trial courts in New York and Connecticut
ruled that the PSLRA’s discovery stay applies not only to 1933 Act Section
11 actions in federal court but also to Section 11 actions in in state court.54
However, states like California—where many IPO firms are headquartered,
including over 50 percent of the firms that adopted FFPs—adopt more leni-
ent standards than the PSLRA. Specifically, California allows discovery to
commence before the motion to dismiss stage concludes, thereby substan-
tially increasing the cost borne by the defendants.55
Second, the PLSRA imposes various requirements on the identity of
lead plaintiff. In particular, there is a presumption that the court should ap-
point as lead plaintiff the class member with the largest financial interest in
the relief sought.56 The lead plaintiff has the authority to select and retain
class counsel, which is a coveted position for plaintiffs’ lawyers. This re-
quirement has been relatively effective in preventing unscrupulous lawyers
from recruiting nominal plaintiffs and filing claims solely to advance their
interests.57 There is a possibility that Section 11 actions in state courts will
be filed by opportunistic lawyers representing plaintiffs with minimal eco-
nomic losses, just to extract nominal settlements from deep-pocket defend-
ants who want the case to go away.58
Third, although federal courts have a well-developed process for con-
solidating securities class action lawsuits, there is no analogous process for
securities claims brought in state courts. The federal consolidation process
allows cases brought by dispersed shareholders in different jurisdictions
against the same defendant alleging the same charges to be tried together, in
one venue, under one or several lead plaintiffs. These rules facilitate judicial
economy and facilitate consistent results by having similar cases tried in one
court instead of many. They may also reduce costs for defendants, who need
only defend the action in one venue.59 However, there is currently no method
54 See In re Everquote, Inc. Sec. Litig., 106 N.Y.S.3d 828, 828 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7,
2019); City of Livonia Retiree Health & Disability Benefits Plan v. Pitney Bowes Inc., No.
X08 FST CV 18 6038160 S (Conn. Super. Ct. May 15, 2019); see also Klausner et al., supra
note 45, at 13–14 nn.26–27 (collecting cases where state courts are either staying their pro- R
ceedings pending resolution of a parallel federal case, or staying discovery pursuant to the
PSLRA).
55 See, e.g., Buelow v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv-05179-BLF, 2016 WL
234159 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2016) (refusing to stay discovery pursuant to PSLRA).
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 77Z-1(a)(3)(B) (2018).
57 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff
Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 869 (2005)
(finding that public institutions began serving as lead plaintiff more often after the passage of
PSLRA, and that this was associated with increases in class recoveries).
58 For an example of a state court that authorized a lead plaintiff that had previously been
found woefully inadequate when bringing the same action in federal court, see In re
BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 795
(8th Cir. 2001).
59 See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 3861–62 (4th ed. 2019); George T. Conway III, Note, The Consolidation of Multistate
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for similarly consolidating actions brought in the courts of multiple states, or
consolidating parallel state and federal actions. Although some state courts
may facilitate judicial economy by applying the doctrines of lis pendens
(staying the case until a federal court decides on the matter) or forum non
conveniens (dismissing the case in favor of a more suitable forum, whether
federal court or the courts of another state), they may choose not to do so.60
Accordingly, defendants may incur more costs defending such actions in
multiple venues, and different courts may reach different conclusions based
on the same facts.
Fourth, federal courts require pleadings in Section 11 cases to adhere to
the Twombly/Iqbal standard: the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”61 and cannot rely on conclusory
statements in making their case.62 Most federal courts hearing Section 11
claims apply the even more stringent pleading standard imposed by Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that such cases are
based on “fraud” claims.63 Under Rule 9(b), a complaint must “state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”64 In contrast,
the pleading standards in many states’ courts are more lenient than either the
Twombly/Iqbal or Rule 9(b) frameworks.65 In particular, the standard in Cali-
fornia merely requires a plaintiff to plead a “statement of the facts constitut-
ing the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”66
Finally, there is a concern that state judges may be unduly favorable to
plaintiffs. With exceptions (most notably the Delaware Chancery Court),
state judges appointed through a partisan process or through popular elec-
tions are likely to be more susceptible to political pressure, and state judges
may lack the technical competence of federal court judges.67 For example,
Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE L.J. 1099 (1987) (praising the federal multidistrict litiga-
tion system for promoting judicial economy and consistency, and advocating for a similar
system of consolidation at the state court level).
60 See Klausner et al., supra note 45, at 6. R
61 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
62 Bell, 550 U.S. at 561; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
63 See Marc I. Steinberg & Brent A. Kirby, The Assault on Section 11 of the Securities
Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2010) (noting that “the
circuits are virtually unanimous in holding that Section 11 claims that sound in fraud are
subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)”).
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
65 Only five states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Twombly/Iqbal pleading
standards, while many state courts have applied their more lenient pleading standards to fed-
eral claims. See Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 411, 424–27 (2018).
66 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10 (West 2016). See Klausner et al., supra note 45, at 5 R
(noting that the standard in New York may be higher).
67 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122 (1977)
(arguing that state judges were less technically proficient and less insulated from political
pressure); Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The
Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selection, 60 J.L.
& ECON. 559 (2017) (finding that judges are more partisan in systems where they are elected,
rather than appointed).
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California’s judicial system—in which judges are either appointed by the
Governor or popularly elected68—is ranked 47th by the United States Cham-
ber of Commerce in its influential survey of state judicial climates for corpo-
rate defendants.69 Local judges may be more favorable to local law firms
whose lawyers often share the same background as the judges, and local
judges may want to encourage local litigation in order to enhance their own
reputation.70
Recent trends in forum-shopping in Section 11 cases following the
Cyan decision demonstrate that these differences have an impact on where
plaintiffs file cases. A recent study found a sharp increase in the proportion
of cases filed in state courts in 2018. The number of cases filed exclusively
in federal courts fell from 67 percent in the period from 2014 to March 2018
to only 23 percent from March to December 2018.71 Most of the filings oc-
cur in New York, where cases were previously removed to federal court
based on a narrow construction of SLUSA, and California, where many of
the IPO firms are headquartered.72 There is also a decline in filings in federal
courts against California-headquartered firms.73 Overall, these preliminary
trends are consistent with a broader phenomenon of forum shopping by
plaintiffs towards jurisdictions that would be most receptive to their litiga-
tion strategy.74
Moreover, the ongoing trend towards filing in state court is consistent
with evidence that shows that the outcomes in state courts tend to be less
favorable to corporate defendants. The percentage of state court cases in
which a motion to dismiss is granted is substantially lower than that of fed-
eral court cases (19 percent in state courts as compared to 42 percent in
68 See Judicial Selection in the States: California, NATL. CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=CA.
69 See DAVID KRANE ET AL., 2017 LAWSUIT CLIMATE SURVEY: RANKING THE STATES, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 9 (2017), Stephen J. Choi et al., Judicial Evaluations and Informa-
tion Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313, 1327 (2009).
70 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 502 (1987) (arguing that Delaware’s “bar and
the judiciary are tied together through an intricate web of personal and professional contacts”);
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 687–88 (1974) (observing that state judges are often drawn from the ranks of the state
bar, and can develop legal doctrine and procedural rules to benefit their former colleagues).
71 See Klausner et al., supra note 45, at 8–9. R
72 See id. at 7.
73 See STEFAN BOETTRICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION: 2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING 10 (2019).
74 See, e.g., William H.J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v.
Allstate on Forum Shopping in the New York Courts, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 151 (2013); Neel
U. Sukhatme, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Forum Shopping in Diversity Cases
(2014) (unpublished manuscript) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=19892
50); Klerman & Reilly, supra note 16, at 242–47; Eldar & Sukahtme, supra note 16, at 158 R
n.211; Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-
Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1254
(2018).
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federal courts from 2011 to 2018).75 Section 11 lawsuits litigated in state
courts settle more often than those in federal courts, presumably because
more of the latter do not survive motions to dismiss. Specifically, from 2011
to 2018, the settlement rate was 59 percent in claims litigated solely in fed-
eral court, 65 percent in claims litigated solely in state court, and 83 percent
if the claim was litigated in both state and federal court.76 While there is no
clear evidence that settlement amounts in state courts are materially different
from those in federal courts,77 the lower rate of dismissal and higher
probability of settlement suggest that the overall litigation expenses for cor-
porate defendants are substantially higher in state courts as compared to fed-
eral courts.
In light of the above, it is easy to see why FFPs may be important for
firms that are susceptible to Section 11 lawsuits. An FFP may mean that the
firm is much more likely to have claims dismissed, thereby avoiding not
only the possibility of making a settlement payment, but perhaps more im-
portantly avoiding the reputational and the opportunity costs associated with
litigating cases that may not be meritorious. One study suggests that the
negative stock price impact associated with securities class action litigation
can be substantial.78 Accordingly, FFPs may save substantial costs for firms,
particularly those that wish to go public, and likewise, the Sciabacucchi de-
cision that prohibited FFPs likely had the opposite effect. Thus, it is not
surprising that after Cyan, and prior to Sciabacucchi, several law firms pre-
dicted that more IPO firms would adopt FFPs in their organizational
documents.79
III. WHICH FIRMS ADOPT FEDERAL EXCLUSIVE PROVISIONS?
In this part, we empirically examine the pattern of FFP provision adop-
tions. We manually collected data on exclusive forum provisions from the
75 See Klausner et al., supra note 45, at 10. R
76 See id. at 11.
77 The median settlement amount in state Section 11 lawsuits was greater than that for
federal cases, but the latter cases had a higher mean settlement amount. It has only been
approximately a year since Cyan, so the relative settlement amounts for state and federal Sec-
tion 11 lawsuits could change as parties adjust their litigating strategies with time. See id. at
12.
78 See Amar Gande & Craig M. Lewis, Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits:
Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers, 44 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
823, 829 (2009) (finding a lawsuit-related stock price decline of 9.79 percent).
79 See, e.g., Peter L. Welsh et al., Cyan v. Beaver County: Implications Moving Forward,
32 INSIGHTS, Apr. 2018, at 7 (predicting companies will adopt federal forum provisions); DA-
VIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, THE SUPREME COURT’S CYAN DECISION AND WHAT HAPPENS
NEXT (2018) (“[I]ssuers and potential issuers may attempt to respond to the Court’s decision
by updating their articles of incorporation with a clause stipulating that federal court will be
the exclusive venue for all 1933 Act class actions”); CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON
LLP, SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT SECURITIES ACT CLASS ACTIONS MAY BE BROUGHT IN
STATE COURT (2018) (“[C]ompanies may wish to consider adopting forum selection by-laws
requiring Securities Act class actions to be filed in federal court”).
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SEC website. The full dataset includes 107 firms that adopted an exclusive
forum provision in their charter or bylaws. Out of 107 firms, 72 adopted the
provision in their charter, and the rest adopted it in the bylaws.80 Adoption of
the provision in the charter makes it harder for shareholders to repeal the
provision, because only the board typically has the right to propose to amend
the charter,81 whereas shareholders have the right to initiate amendments to
the bylaws.82 While there is some variation, a typical federal exclusive forum
provision states: “Unless the Company consents in writing to the selection
of an alternative forum, the federal district courts of the United States of
America shall be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any complaint
asserting a cause of action arising under the Securities Act of 1933.”83
Whereas most firms seek to restrict lawsuits to federal courts generally,
some firms go further by explicitly limiting the forum to the federal district
court in the district in which they are incorporated, primarily Delaware,84 or
the district in which they are located.85 Although the wording of the provi-
sion tends to be very similar across firms, there are also a few idiosyncratic
provisions.86
Most of the firms adopted the provision in their IPOs, the first IPO firm
being Snap, Inc. in February 2017. This is unsurprising, because most claims
under the 1933 Act relate to misstatements or omissions in the prospectus or
the registration statement filed prior to the IPO. Some firms adopted the
provision in the context of a merger transaction in which the acquiring com-
pany issued and registered new shares. In fact, the first issuer that adopted
the provision in September 2016, Lpath, Inc., was not an IPO firm.87
80 Three firms adopted the provision in both the charter and bylaws.
81 Compare DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2018) (stipulating that “board of direc-
tors shall adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment” to the corporate charter), with id.
§ 109(a) (“the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to
vote . . .”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting the Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1825–29 (1989)
(explaining how directors wield greater bargaining power over shareholders in charter amend-
ments, as they alone have the power to propose these amendments); Choi & Min, supra note 4 R
(explaining how shareholders can propose amendments to bylaws, though most large corpora-
tions now allow directors to unilaterally amend them).
82 See sources cited supra, note 81. R
83 See, e.g., Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 43 (Feb. 2, 2017).
84 See, e.g., Axonics Modulation Technologies, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation (Exhibit 3.6) art. VIII, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1603756/000
119312518303533/d609102dex36.htm.
85 For a provision restricting jurisdiction to the district court for the district of Massachu-
setts, see Avrobio, Inc., Amended and Restated By-laws (Exhibit 3.5) art. VI § 8, https://www
.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1681087/000119312518188630/d562006dex35.htm.
86 See, e.g., Graf Industrial Corp., Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorpora-
tion (Exhibit 3.2) art. XII, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1745317/0001144204
18053781/0001144204-18-053781-index.htm (“the Court of Chancery of the State of Dela-
ware shall be the sole and exclusive forum . . . [except] any claim arising under the federal
securities laws, as to which the federal district court for the District of Delaware shall be the
sole and exclusive forum.”).
87 See Lpath, Inc., Amended and Restated Bylaws (Exhibit 3.1) art. XV, https://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1251769/000110465916143729/0001104659-16-143729-index.htm.
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Because the adoption of federal exclusive forum provisions is mainly
driven by IPO firms, we plot the likelihood that a firm adopts the provision
in the IPO in Figure 1, shown in Appendix A. We compute this likelihood
simply as the percentage of IPOs in a given month that adopted the provision
out of the total number of IPOs that month, starting in February 2017 (when
Snap, Inc. adopted the first provision). As is clear from the figure, Cyan and
Sciabacucchi had a material impact on whether firms adopted federal exclu-
sive forum provisions. Prior to the Cyan decision, there is a mild increase in
the likelihood of adopting the provision. After Cyan, there is a large jump of
over 10 percent in the likelihood of adoption, and an ongoing increase in this
likelihood until the Sciabacucchi decision. After Sciabacucchi, however,
there is a sharp decline of over 10 percent, and then a gradual decrease
through June 2019. Presumably, some firms continued to adopt the provision
with the hope that the Sciabacucchi decision would be reversed by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court.
In Table 1, shown in Appendix B, we evaluate the characteristics of
FFP-adopting firms at the IPO stage, and compare them to firms that did not
adopt a FFP. We obtained data on IPO firms first from the SDC database and
then matched it to financial data from Compustat. We obtained data on stock
prices from CRSP and data on firm age from Professor Jay Ritter’s website.
Financial data is from the fiscal year ending prior to the year of the IPO. As
already shown in Figure 1, most of the adoptions occurred in the period after
the Cyan decision, but before the Sciabacucchi decision.
Importantly, adopting firms are more likely to belong to industries that
are known to be particularly vulnerable to securities class-action litigation.
Vulnerable industries include the biotechnology, computer hardware, elec-
tronics, retail, and computer software industries.88 Specifically, over 70 per-
cent of the adopting firms operate in the pharmaceutical, medical equipment
or computer software industries.
The IPOs of adopting firms tend to be relatively large, as manifested by
the relatively larger proceeds of these IPOs (“IPO Proceeds”). Somewhat
more tellingly, these IPOs tend to be underpriced. In other words, while
most companies see their stock price greatly increase on the first day of
trading, the percentage increase is larger in our sample for firms with FFPs
than for non-adopting firms. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
adopting firms face a high probability of litigation, as earlier research sug-
gests that firms with higher litigation probability are more likely to under-
88 See Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Disclosures and Stockholder Lawsuits, 23 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 249, 256 n.5 (1997); Jonathan L. Rogers & Phillip C. Stocken, Credibility of Manage-
ment Forecasts, 80 ACCT. REV. 1233, 1257 (2005); Francois Brochet & Suraj Srinivasan, Ac-
countability of Independent Directors: Evidence From Firms Subject to Securities Litigation,
111 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 448 (2014).
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price their issuances.89 Other variables further suggest that adopting firms
may be more susceptible to lawsuits. In particular, these firms are more
likely to have negative earnings, which could potentially induce investors to
sue if the firm fails to generate income after the IPO, and also relatively
higher levels of cash, which makes the firm a good target for lawsuits.
The governance of firms that adopt FFPs tends to be more shareholder-
friendly than that of non-adopting firms. First, over 80 percent of them are
backed by venture capital (“VC”) or private equity (“PE”) firms. Prior re-
search has shown that the IPOs backed by VC or PE firms are more likely to
exhibit a better governance structure, such as more independent boards.90
Moreover, adopting firms are less likely to have a dual-class structure fol-
lowing the IPO. This suggests that these provisions are not driven by con-
trolling shareholders seeking to protect themselves from potential liability.
Finally, virtually all of the adopting firms are incorporated in Delaware
and over half are headquartered in California. This is unsurprising, given the
high percentage of VC/PE-backed IPOs in the sample. More interestingly,
we document the association between the retention of law firms that pio-
neered the use of FFPs and adoption rates. We construct a variable called
Law Firm, which equals 1 if the firm retained one of three law firms: Coo-
ley, Goodwin Procter and Wilson Sonsini. The companies that retained these
law firms were more than six times more likely to adopt the provision.
In Table 2, we depict descriptive statistics of firms that were subject to
lawsuits pursuant to Section 11 under the 1933 Act in from 1996 to 2018,
and compare them to IPO firms that were not subject to such lawsuits. We
obtained this data from the Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, which we matched to SDC data on IPOs as well as data from
Compustat, CRSP and Jay Ritter’s website (as applicable).91 The characteris-
tics that distinguish IPOs that are followed by a lawsuit seem to be very
similar to those that characterize firms that adopt FFPs. Specifically, the
firms tend to belong to industries that are vulnerable to litigation, they have
larger IPO proceeds, they are more likely to have negative earnings and
higher cash, they are more likely to be backed by VC or PE firms, and they
are more likely to underprice their IPOs.
In Tables 3 through 5, we supplement the descriptive statistics with
regression analysis. In Table 3, we estimate a logit model where the depen-
89 See Michelle Lowry & Susan Shu, Litigation Risk and IPO Underpricing, 65 J. FIN.
ECON. 309, 330 (2002); Qing Hao, Securities Litigation, Withdrawal Risk and Initial Public
Offerings, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 438, 446 (2011).
90 See Yael V. Hochberg, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public
Firm, 16 REV. FIN. 429 (2012) (finding that venture capital-backed IPOs had better corporate
governance features); Viral V. Acharya et al., Corporate Governance and Value Creation:
Evidence from Private Equity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 368, 370 (2013) (showing that the human
capital of private equity partners creates lasting value for shareholders of their portfolio
companies).
91 Note that the Stanford litigation data does not include information about Section 12
lawsuits, so our analysis is restricted to Section 11 litigation.
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dent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if a firm is subject to a Section 11
lawsuit, and zero otherwise. The marginal effects in such regressions reflect
the percentage increase or decrease of changing the independent variable by
one unit. As shown in columns 1 and 2, if a firm belongs to a vulnerable
industry, then it is about 4 percent more likely to be subject to a Section 11
lawsuit. In addition, larger IPOs and firms with negative earnings are more
likely to be sued. The coefficient on the cash ratio is not statistically signifi-
cant, however, but this may be because the variable is highly correlated with
other variables.92 In columns 3 and 4, we show that VC/PE-backed IPOs are
more likely to be sued, and so are firms that underprice their securities in
anticipation of potential lawsuits.93 Finally, as shown in column 5, younger
firms are more likely to be sued. We note that in columns 3 to 5, the coeffi-
cients on some variables, in particular vulnerable industries, are not statisti-
cally significant, presumably because they are highly correlated with other
variables.
The main results of this analysis are in Table 4, where the dependent
variable is an indicator that equals 1 if a firm adopted an exclusive FFP, and
zero otherwise, and the sample is restricted to the period of 2017 to 2019,
when firms started adopting FFPs. As shown in column 1, a firm in an in-
dustry which is vulnerable to litigation is about 16 percent more likely to
adopt the provision. Moreover, after Cyan, firms are about 16 percent more
likely to adopt the provision, and after Sciabacucchi, the probability de-
creased by almost 9 percent (16.4 percent minus 7.7 percent). The results
numerically confirm the general trends suggested by the pattern of adoption
depicted in Figure 1. Column 2 shows that firms with high levels of cash or
negative earnings are more inclined to adopt the provision. Specifically,
firms with negative earnings are about 12 percent more likely to adopt the
provision.
In column 3, we add governance measures to the regression. We find
that the IPOs that are backed by VC or PE firms are about 14.4 percent more
likely to adopt the provision, and that firms with a dual class stock structure
are 8.7 percent less likely to adopt it. Interestingly, in this specification, the
association of vulnerable industries, negative earnings, and cash becomes
statistically insignificant. The likely reason for this is that many of these
variables are correlated with investments by venture capital firms that tend
to invest in high-growth firms with lower earnings.
Column 4 shows that firms incorporated in Delaware and headquartered
in California are substantially more likely to adopt the provision. Moreover,
as expected, companies that retained one of the three innovating law firms
(Cooley, Goodwin Procter, or Wilson Sonsini) were 15 percent more likely
92 In particular, cash ratio is highly positively correlated with firms belonging to vulnera-
ble industries.
93 This is consistent with Lowry & Shu, supra note 89 (finding that firms with higher R
exposure to Section 11 lawsuits are more likely to underprice their offerings); cf. Hao, supra
note 89 (finding no relationship between underpricing and the probability of lawsuits). R
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to adopt the provision. We emphasize again, however, that these additional
variables are highly correlated with other variables and likely endogenous,
because they are variables chosen by the firms. For example, we would ex-
pect a venture-backed biotechnology firm located in California to retain
Cooley, incorporate in Delaware, and have low earnings in its early years. In
column 5, we add the age variable, which suggests that younger firms are
more likely to adopt the provision. However, the coefficient on the age vari-
able is not statistically significant.
In Table 5, we link the probability of adopting FFPs to the estimated
probability of litigation based on the estimates presented in Table 3. We
compute the predicted probability of getting sued using the coefficient esti-
mates from column 5 in Table 3 (though the results are robust to using the
specifications in other columns). We show that the probability of adopting
an FFP is higher when the probability of litigation is higher. The results
imply that one standard deviation in predicted litigation probability (which is
6.2 percent) is associated with a 7.4 to 12.1 percent higher likelihood of
adopting an FFP (depending on the specification). In columns 2 and 3, we
add variables not used in computing the litigation probability (i.e., those not
included in column 5 of Table 3). The results confirm that firms with dual-
class stock structures are less likely to adopt FFPs, and that adoption is
driven in part by specific law firms that pioneered the use of FFPs.
IV. MEASURING THE EFFECT OF SCIABACUCCHI ON FIRM VALUE
In this Part, we empirically examine the impact of Sciabacucchi. We
focus on the firms that have adopted an FFP in their organizational docu-
ments, and see whether the Sciabacucchi decision had any discernable effect
on their stock prices. Although various commentators have argued the im-
portance of FFPs, whether it would indeed have any significant effect on a
firm’s valuation has been open to debate. Using the event study methodol-
ogy, we attempt to examine the magnitude of the effect.
A. Data and Empirical Strategy
We obtain data on securities returns from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (“CRSP”).94 In Figure 2, we plot the average returns of the
firms that had an exclusive forum provision around the date that
Sciabacucchi was decided (December 19, 2018). We compare these returns
to the return on the market portfolio, which is the value-weight return of all
public firms available on CRSP, incorporated in the US, and listed on the
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.95 As is apparent in Figure 2, the sample firms
94 Returns are equal to today’s price plus any dividends, divided by yesterday’s price.
95 See Kenneth R. French, U.S. Research Returns Data, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Breakpoints.
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experienced lower returns around the date of the decision as compared to the
market portfolio, specifically in the period starting two days before the deci-
sion (December 17, 2018) and ending two days afterwards (December 21,
2018). This suggests that Sciabacucchi had a negative effect on the sample
firms.
The fact that Sciabacucchi was a significant event is further supported
by anecdotal evidence. Thirty firms in the sample reported the decision in 8-
Ks in order to inform the market that the company did not intend to enforce
the provision due to the Sciabacucchi decision,96 and some even announced
their intention to remove the provision at the next annual meeting if the
decision was not appealed or if the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
Chancery Court’s decision.97
We use event study methodology to evaluate the stock price effect of
the Sciabacucchi decision. The first is a standard event study. The underly-
ing assumption of event studies is that markets are efficient, so when a case
is decided, stock prices reflect the news.98 The first step in an event study is
to define the event of interest and the date or dates when the market learned
about or anticipated the event. We define the day when Sciabacucchi was
decided as event date 0. We focus on the period starting two business days
prior to the date of the decision and two business days after the decision (i.e.,
event window (-2,+2)), but we also examine the period starting seven trad-
ing days prior to the decision and ending seven days after the decision (i.e.,
from December 10, 2018 to December 31, 2018). In particular, because the
market may be familiar with the views of Delaware judges on broad policy
matters, and given that Delaware judges tend to be vocal on such matters, it
is possible that the market could anticipate a decision a few days before it is
announced.99 In addition, it may take a few days for investors to be fully
informed about a decision and its full ramifications. The first 8-K reporting
the Sciabacucchi decision by Snap Inc. was filed on December 21, two days
after the decision.100
The next step is to estimate what the expected return for each stock
would have been during the event period if the event had not occurred (i.e.,
if Sciabacucchi had not been decided). The abnormal return that is attributa-
ble to the event (i.e., the stock price effect of the event) is the actual return
96 See, e.g., Snap Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 21, 2018).
97 See, e.g., Arlo Technologies, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 31, 2018).
98 For detailed descriptions of the event study methodology, see generally Sanjai Bhagat &
Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law:Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141 (2002); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the
Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380 (2002); A.
Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 13 (1997).
99 See S.P. Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies, 1 HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 3, 10 (Bjørn Espen Eckbo ed., 2008) (“[I]f the event is partially antici-
pated, some of the abnormal return behavior related to the event should show up in the pre-
event period.”).
100 See supra note 88.
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minus the expected return. To compute the expected return on the event win-
dow, we use the Carhart four-factor model in our main specifications:
(1)
where Rit is the return on stock i on date t minus the risk free rate; RMT is the
market return on date t minus the risk free rate; RSMB is the return on a port-
folio of small companies; RHML is the book-to-market factor, which is the
portfolio of firms with high book value to market value ratio; RMOM is the
momentum factor, which is the return on stocks that experienced positive
returns in the prior 12 months; and eit is an error term, common to all regres-
sion models.101 We estimate other alternative models, including the market
model, the three-factor Fama-French model and the five-factor Fama-French
model.102
This regression yields estimated parameters , , ,  and
, which we then use to calculate the expected return on the event date.
This equals , using
the factor portfolios’ returns on the event days. The abnormal return for a
given event date, ARit , for stock i is then simply the actual stock return mi-
nus the expected stock returns:
To estimate the impact of an event within a specific event window, we need
to aggregate the abnormal returns across all days in the event window to
obtain the cumulative abnormal returns. Thus,
where t0 is the first event day and tn is the last event day. The average CARit
across all firms i in the sample is the average cumulative abnormal return
associated with the event. Note that if the event window includes only the
event day, we simply compute the average abnormal return on the event date
across firms.
In estimating the regression model in equation 1, we use observations
from an estimation window of 120 trading days, starting eight trading days
prior to December 19 (i.e., day -127 to -8). Note, however, that because our
sample includes many firms that underwent an IPO in a very recent period,
not all firms have trading data for the full estimation window. In our main
specification, we require firms to have at least 50 trading days in order to be
included in the model. In this specification 65 firms are included in the final
101 For fuller explanation of each factor, see Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual
Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 60–61 (1997).
102 Each of these models is explained in further detail in Kothari & Warner, supra note 99. R
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sample. We also estimate the model using other thresholds, specifically 40,
60, or 80 days.
One concern with an event study of a single event is that the abnormal
returns for the firms during the event window could be correlated with each
other.103 To address this concern, we employ portfolio analysis as an alterna-
tive specification. In this specification, the dependent variable is the return
on the portfolio of equally weighted stocks of the firms that adopted exclu-
sive forum provisions, and the independent variables are the factor
portfolios:
(2)
,
where Rpt is the return on the equally weighted portfolio of all the firms in
our sample, and Dt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a date t is within the
relevant event window. In this specification, the estimated coefficient on Dt
, is equal to the average abnormal return of the firms in the portfolio
associated with each day within the relevant event window. The cumulative
abnormal return then equals the number of days in the event window times
. For example, if Dt equals one for three event days (say, -1, 0 and +1),
then the average CAR equals three times the estimated abnormal return
( ).
B. Results
We first show the results estimating equation (1). Using that equation,
we compute the abnormal returns for each of the event dates from day -7 to
day +7. We depict the average abnormal returns for each of these days in
Figure 3. The results suggest that the stock price of the firms in our samples
exhibit smaller abnormal returns on event days -2 to +2. The abnormal re-
turns before this event window from -7 to -3, and after the event window
from +3 to +7, do not seem to yield any clear patterns, although it is note-
worthy that the abnormal returns in the days before -2 appear to be lower
than those after +2.
Table 6 shows the cumulative abnormal return associated with different
event windows. In column 1, we report first the average abnormal returns for
day 0, which is -1.82 percent, although it is statistically significant only at
the 10 percent level. The results for wider event windows appear to be larger
and more statistically significant. Thus, the effect associated with event win-
dows (0,+1), (0,+2), (-1,+1), and (-2,+2) are -3.15 percent, -4.73 percent, -
4.18 percent, and -7.43 percent, all statistically significant at the 1 percent
103 See James W. Kolari & Seppo Pynnönen, Event Study Testing with Cross-Sectional
Correlation of Abnormal Returns, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 3996 (2010).
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level. Note that the cumulative abnormal returns associated with the period
(-7,-3) or the period (+3,+7) are not statistically significant.
In Table 7, we show the results from estimating the model in equation
(2). The results of this model are even stronger and are broadly consistent
with our main results. Column 1 indicates that the average abnormal return
associated with event date 0 is -1.83 percent (and is statistically significant at
the 5 percent level). Columns 2 through 5 show that the abnormal returns
associated with the event dates within each event window are between -1.39
percent and -1.57 percent. Multiplying these coefficients by the number of
days in the relevant window, the cumulative abnormal returns implied by the
estimated coefficients are essentially the same as under equation 1. Finally,
in column 6, we also estimate the abnormal returns for event windows (-7,-
3) and (+3,+7). The results again suggest that there are no abnormal returns
associated with these days. Accordingly, the firms in our sample appear to
experience an abnormal stock price effect only around the Sciabacucchi
decision.
In Tables 8 and 9, we further look at the stock price effects on specific
types of firms. In Panel A, we look at firms that belong to industries identi-
fied in prior research as being prone to securities class action litigation.
These include firms in the biotechnology, computer hardware, computer
software, electronics, and retail industries. All the results for these firms are
more economically and statistically significant than for the total sample. The
cumulative abnormal returns around the event window (-2,+2) is almost 10
percent, suggesting that the case had a very large negative effects on these
firms.
In Panel B, we examine only firms that adopted the exclusive FFP in
their charters. Whereas shareholders have the right to amend the bylaws,
only the board of directors has the right to initiate amendments to the char-
ter.104 This arguably means that these provisions may be stickier, and it may
be more difficult for shareholders to amend them if they are not conducive to
shareholder value. The results are broadly robust to this specification, though
they tend to be less statistically and economically significant. The abnormal
return of -1.37 percent on date 0 is not statistically significant using the
model in equation 1 (see column 1 of Table 8, Panel B). There is an abnor-
mal return of -1.39 percent that is statistically significant at the 10 percent
level using the model in equation 2 (see column 1 of Table 9, Panel B).
However, it is likely that the lower significance is mainly due to the fact that
this sample includes only 42 firms, and, in any event, the negative effect in
other event windows remains substantial; and at least in Table 9, statistically
significant at the 5 percent or 1 percent levels for all other event windows.
In Panel D, we exclude IPO firms with a dual-class stock structure. The
remaining firms are arguably the better firms, because they are less prone to
agency problems and therefore may arguably be expected to be less affected
104 See Bebchuk, supra note 81. R
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by the Sciabacucchi decision and litigation more broadly. However, as in
Panel A, all the results for these firms are more economically and statisti-
cally significant than for the total sample, even though the total sample is
smaller.
In Panel E, we examine firms that underpriced their securities at the
IPO. It is therefore likely that investors in these firms made gains by buying
securities in the IPO. The results are again robust as to this specification. In
Panel F, we evaluate firms with a share price higher than the IPO price at
date -3. This means that as of the date of Sciabacucchi, if the shareholders
were to file a Section 11 lawsuit on that day, they would have gained noth-
ing, since they would have been unable to show any harm (damages) from
alleged misrepresentations or misstatements.105 Although the sample in-
cludes only 28 firms, the results are again robust and even more economi-
cally significant for some event windows.
Finally, we emphasize that our results are robust using other asset pric-
ing models, specifically, the market model and the Fama-French three or five
factor models. The results are also robust when we include firms that have
only 40 trading days in the estimation window, or alternatively, at least 60,
70, or 80 days in the estimation window.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this Part we discuss the main implications of the empirical results.
First, firms with a high probability of facing IPO-related lawsuits are more
likely to adopt FFPs, and it is difficult to argue that the adoption is driven by
firms with more serious agency problems. This suggests that the firms that
choose to adopt FFPs may not necessarily be the “bad apples,” but rather
firms that are more likely to be targeted by plaintiffs.106 The vast shift of
Section 11 lawsuits from federal courts to state courts indicates that plain-
tiffs, likely influenced by their lawyers, are looking to evade the more de-
manding requirements imposed by the PLSRA and federal pleading
standards. Firms that adopt FFPs want to protect themselves from the possi-
bility that the firm will be embroiled in unnecessary litigation, and might
have to settle just to get rid of lawsuits that may take place in state courts
that have limited expertise and experience in securities litigation.
Second, the Sciabacucchi decision is associated with a high negative
stock price effect, and the effect persists for firms with arguably lower
agency costs and for firms that are less likely to pay any damages in Section
11 lawsuits (either because their stock was priced relatively low at the IPO
or because their stock was trading at a higher price than the IPO price prior
105 As discussed supra note 19, if the company’s share price is above the IPO price at the R
time the plaintiff files a lawsuit, she gets nothing in Section 11 damages.
106 Of course, we cannot overrule the possibility that there is some unobserved fraudulent
intent associated with adopting FFPs.
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to the Sciabacucchi decision). We note, however, that the magnitude of the
stock price effect, amounting to more than 7 percent for the event period (-
2,+2), appears to be very high. Taken at face value, this suggests that the
decision reduced the total market capitalization of a firm with an FFP by 7
percent.107 It is thus questionable whether we can attribute all of this effect to
the Sciabacucchi decision. As in any event study, there is always a possibil-
ity that something else may have happened around the event window that
may have affected the stock price of the firms in our sample.
However, even if there are other events that may confound the effect of
the decisions, the size of the stock price effects strongly suggests that, at the
very least, it is safe to rule out the possibility that Sciabacucchi positively
affected the stock price of firms that adopted FFPs. Moreover, given the
very high negative stock price effect of shareholder class action litigations
(valued by one study at almost 10 percent),108 and the impact that litigating
in state court as opposed to federal court has on litigation outcomes (dis-
cussed in Part II), it may be argued that the negative stock price effect does
actually reflect the negative impact of Sciabacucchi on firm value.
That said, there is a concern that the decline in stock prices may simply
reflect the higher likelihood that firms will have to pay large amounts in
settlements from their own funds, rather than reflecting the desirability of
these provisions. However, we emphasize that the negative stock price effect
seems very high compared to the typical settlement amounts. The higher
probability of obtaining recovery in a settlement if a claim in federal court is
also litigated in a state court as opposed to litigated only in state court (83
percent compared to 59 percent), multiplied by the average settlement
amounts in Section 11 lawsuits (about $10 million),109 is well below the loss
in market value observed in the event study, whichever event window we
use. A likely explanation is that the negative effect of litigation does not
only reflect the likely recovery amounts, but rather mainly reflects the im-
pact of litigation on the firm’s reputation and goodwill,110 and the concern
that protracted litigation could distract managers from pursuing valuable
107 In general, large stock price effects may be partly driven by thinly-traded stocks with
very low prices. When the stock price is low (for example, below one dollar) or the volume of
trading is low, any small changes in the price or a small number of trades can generate large
shifts in stock returns. However, we emphasize that the relatively large stock price effect is not
driven by low stock prices or trading volume. All the firms in our sample are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq, and the price of the stock at the IPO is at least five dollars.
Moreover, even when we exclude five firms whose stocks traded below three dollars or whose
trading volume was below 1,000 stocks on the date Sciabacucchi was decided, the results are
qualitatively the same.
108 See Gande & Lewis, supra note 78, at 8. R
109 See Klausner et al., supra note 45, at 11. R
110 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms
Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757 (1993) (arguing that the reputa-
tional cost constitutes most of the cost incurred by firms accused and convicted of fraud);
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1009 (1997) (recasting Delaware corporate law as a series of reputational as well as
financial constraints on managers to make them work in the shareholders’ interests).
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projects and divert corporate resources to dispute resolution.111 This is con-
sistent with the high negative stock price effect associated with the filing of
securities class action litigations, which also substantially exceeds the poten-
tial recovery amounts.112
VI. SCIABACUCCHI AND THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT’S REVERSAL
While the results of the empirical analysis are not dispositive, they gen-
erally lend some support to the view that the FFPs are desirable and do not
undermine shareholders’ rights. The most straightforward policy response to
address this may be to reform the 1933 Act or SLUSA to restrict these law-
suits to federal courts, the path taken by the jurisdictional rules under the
1934 Act.113 However, Congress may be slow to act, and there may not be
sufficient political support for reforming the federal law. Furthermore, it still
leaves open the question of to what extent a corporation’s organizational
documents can regulate federal issues, such as the 1933 Act claims. Accord-
ingly, it may be worth examining the legal basis of Sciabacucchi to evaluate
whether or not there is a plausible legal theory that can justify the opposite
outcome of validating FFPs in charters and bylaws. More broadly, reexamin-
ing Sciabacucchi is an opportunity to evaluate the scope of existing corpo-
rate law doctrines on internal affairs and corporate contract.
We emphasize that we do not claim that the legal basis of Sciabacucchi
is unfounded. There is a legitimate argument that a claim based on the 1933
Act is not a claim that deals with the “internal affairs” of a corporation and,
furthermore, charters or bylaws can only deal with matters that relate to the
“internal” affairs. For instance, Boilermakers can be understood to stand for
the proposition that a forum selection provision is valid if it regulates “inter-
nal affairs claims brought by stockholders qua stockholders.”114 In line with
this reasoning, Sciabacucchi held that claims under the 1933 Act are “exter-
nal” to the corporation’s affairs. The cause of action under the 1933 Act
belongs to a “security” purchaser, including securities other than stocks,
rather than to stockholders, who already own shares in the corporation. Boil-
ermakers, by contrast, validated forum selection provisions that related to
111 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securi-
ties Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 571 (1991) (citing the foregone business time man-
agers need to spend on the litigation as a major indirect cost of securities litigation); see also
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating “key personnel may be distracted from
corporate business by continuance of the litigation”).
112 Gande & Lewis, supra note 78. R
113 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2018); see supra note 22. R
114 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 952 (Del. Ch.
2013).
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lawsuits under Delaware corporate law, such as derivative litigation and law-
suits asserting breach of fiduciary duties.115
As is clear from the description of Boilermakers and Sciabacucchi,
there are two important issues that need to be resolved in order to answer
whether a charter or a bylaw provision can dictate shareholders’ right to
bring a 1933 Act claim in a specified forum.116 The first deals with the ques-
tion as to what extent a charter or a bylaw provision can deal with issues that
are “external” (or “not internal”) to the affairs of a corporation. That is, if
we determine or assume that a 1933 Act claim is an “external” claim, i.e., it
does not deal with the internal affairs of a corporation, does that mean that
the charter or the bylaws can no longer dictate or regulate its forum? This
issue touches more broadly upon the question regarding the scope of the
contractarian theory that courts have been utilizing with respect to corporate
charters and bylaws. The second issue has to do with the boundaries of the
internal affairs doctrine itself. Can we argue that a 1933 Act claim can be
treated as an “internal,” rather than an “external” claim?
In addressing these issues, two sets of Delaware General Corporation
Law (“DGCL”) provisions play a prominent role. The first is DGCL
§102(b)(1), together with §109(b), and the second is DGCL §115. DGCL
§102, titled “Contents of Certificate of Incorporation,” which lays out types
of matters that can be addressed through a charter or bylaws. More specifi-
cally, DGCL §102(b) states that:
the certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of the
following matters: (1) Any provision for the management of the
business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and
any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the pow-
ers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders. . . .
Similarly, DGCL §109(b), which deals with the contents of the bylaws,
states that: “the bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law
or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corpo-
ration, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or
powers of its stockholders, directors, officers, or employees. . . .”117
While DGCL §§102 and 109 deal fairly broadly with the permissible
matters that can be addressed through charters and bylaws, DGCL §115, by
115 Furthermore, both Boilermakers and Sciabacucchi can be understood to stand for the
proposition that the right to sue under the 1933 Act in any specific court cannot be waived or
modified through the charter or the bylaws.
116 There also is a third, ancillary issue: how and whether to make the interpretations of
the relevant statutory provisions, i.e., DGCL §§102(b), 109(b), and 115, consistent with one
another. As shown below, while DGCL §§102(b) and 109(b) speak of “affairs” of corporation,
DGCL §115 provides an express definition of “internal affairs.” One can argue that when the
statute mentions “affairs,” they mean “internal affairs.”
117 Finally, DGCL §102(b)(1) also states that “any provision which is required or permit-
ted by any section of this chapter to be stated in the bylaws may instead be stated in the
certificate of incorporation.”
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contrast, deals more specifically with forum selection provisions. The sec-
tion states:
The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require. . .that
any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and
exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State, and no provi-
sion of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit
bringing such claims in the courts of this State. “Internal corporate
claims” means claims, including claims in the right of the corpora-
tion, (i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or
former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity, or (ii) as
to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery.
In short, DGCL §115 allows a charter of a bylaw provision to dictate that an
“internal corporate claim” to be brought “in any or all of the courts” of
Delaware, but does not allow such claims to be brought solely in non-Dela-
ware courts.
A. The Boundaries of the Corporate Contract
Here we address the first question concerning the extent to which a
charter or a bylaw provision can deal with claims that are not “internal”
corporate claims. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that we agree that a
1933 Act claim is not an internal corporate claim, as defined in DGCL §115.
The first obvious implication of this assumption is that, given that DGCL
§115 deals only with “internal corporate claims,” a 1933 Act claim will no
longer be subject to the DGCL §115 requirements. At the same time, how-
ever, that conclusion does not necessarily prevent charters and bylaws from
adopting an exclusive forum clause for an “external” claim. Note, foremost,
that both DGCL §102(b)(1) and §109(b) are written fairly broadly. In the
case of §102(b)(1), for instance, a charter provision can address not only the
“the conduct of the affairs of the corporation,” it can also “creat[e], limit[ ]
and regulat[e] the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the
stockholders.”
One possible interpretation of the statute is to say that while a federal
forum provision does not deal with an “internal” corporate claim, it does
“regulate” or “limit” the “powers . . . of the stockholders,” i.e., their power
to bring a 1933 Act suit as stockholders, and does also deal with the “af-
fairs” of the corporation, i.e., whether and how certain disclosures should be
made to the stockholders under both federal securities and corporate laws.
After all, one can argue that, as stockholders, they are given a bundle of
rights, including those under both the state corporate law and federal securi-
ties law, and thus when they bring a 1933 Act claim, they are exercising
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their powers as stockholders (investors).118 What the federal forum provision
does is then to “limit” or “regulate” their rights or powers (as stockholders)
to bring a 1933 Act claim.
More fundamentally, this approach would expand the reach of the con-
tractarian perception of charters and bylaws, the so-called “corporate con-
tract.”119 The idea that the charters and bylaws can be treated like a
“contract” played an extremely important role in Boilermakers. For in-
stance, the Chancery Court stated: “in an unbroken line of decisions dating
back several generations, our Supreme Court has made clear that the [char-
ters and] bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract between a Dela-
ware corporation and its stockholders.”120
The Chancery Court relied, in part, on Justice Strine’s earlier articula-
tion of Delaware corporate law more generally:
Delaware’s corporation law is not what . . . might be called a
broad-based company law. Aspects of company law like competi-
tion law, labor law, trade, and requirements for the filing of regu-
lar disclosure to public investors, are not part of Delaware’s
corporation law . . . Delaware corporation law governs only the
internal affairs of the corporation (emphasis added). In that sense,
our law is a specialized form of contract law that governs the rela-
tionship between corporate managers—the directors and of-
ficers—of corporations, and the stockholders.121
Therefore, Sciabacucchi espouses a narrow view with respect to both corpo-
rate law and corporate contract. But, of course, this is not the only possible
interpretation of corporate law and corporate contract. Other commentators
have argued that, with respect to other issues, Delaware corporate law (and
the corporate contract) already regulates matters that technically fall outside
118 This argument is further buttressed by the fact that DGCL §102(b) uses the phrase
“affairs of the corporation” and not “internal affairs of the corporation.” Hence, under
§102(b), “affairs of the corporation” also includes non-internal affairs, such as stockholders’
rights under federal securities laws. Instead of using “external” versus “internal” distinction,
some commentators have used the phrase “intra-corporate” claims to denote those that deal
with the “affairs” of corporation. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The
Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Politi-
cal Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325 (2013). Under this approach, one can argue that DGCL
§102(b) allows corporations to put in provisions in their charters and bylaws so long as they
deal with “intra-corporate” matters, even if, technically, the issue may fall outside of corporate
law.
119 For an overview of the development and the application of the “contractarian theory”
of corporate charters and bylaws, see Choi & Min, supra note 4. R
120 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 955 (Del. Ch.
2013).
121 Id. (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and
Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 674 (2005). The
article is based on a speech given by then-Chancellor Strine to the European Policy Forum. In
arguing that Delaware corporate law is meant to apply narrowly, however, there does not seem
to be any citation to existing case law or other doctrines.
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a narrow understanding of corporate law, but are closely related to corporate
law problems, such as stockholders’ right to transfer or sell securities and
debt-holders’ and other non-corporate claimants’ rights to bring claims
against a liquidating corporation.122 As we demonstrate below, Delaware
corporate law, in conjunction with the federal securities laws, also regulates
the proxy process.123
In fact, this seems to be the reasoning adopted by the Delaware Su-
preme Court when it over-turned the Chancery Court’s decision in Salzberg
v. Sciabacucchi.124 The Court focused heavily on the statutory language of
DGCL §102(b) and contrasted that with the language in DGCL §115. In the
process, the Court held that the matters that relate to stockholders’ right to
sue under the federal Securities Act, while not part of internal affairs, can be
classified as “intra-corporate” affairs and, therefore, be regulated through
charters and bylaws.125
If we were to adopt a more expansive notion of the corporate contract
(and also the corporate law more generally), as the Court did in Salzberg v.
Sciabacucchi, given that FFPs will no longer be subject to the restrictions in
DGCL §§109 and 115, it follows fairly naturally that Delaware corporations
may not be able to adopt other non-Delaware forums to resolve 1933 Act
disputes. They may even attempt to adopt a mandatory, individual arbitration
provision for 1933 Act claims. A fee-shifting provision (perhaps even simi-
lar to the version we saw in ATP Tour Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund126) with
122 See Grundfest, supra note 39, at 65 (arguing that DGCL §202(c)(5), for instance, al-
lows charters to impose transfer restrictions and securities ownership). In the asset sale and
liquidation provisions, DGCL §§271 to 285, Delaware corporate statute closely regulates the
rights of various non-stockholders, such as debtholders, contract claimants, contingent claim-
ants, etc., with respect to issues, such as whether and when they are entitled to receive notice,
how they may be able to exercise their right against a dissolving and liquidating corporation,
how much they would be entitled to receive, and whether they can impose liability on the
directors or the shareholders that receive liquidating distribution.
123 See infra Part VI.2.
124 Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 2020 Del. LEXIS 100 (Del. 2020).
125 Id. at 28–35. As a matter of policy, the fact that both the state and the federal laws can
regulate over a certain issue does not tell us what the proper division of labor should be.
Perhaps with respect to certain issues (e.g., some issues closer to market regulation), federal
securities law should take the lead (or perhaps be the sole authority), whereas with respect to
certain other issues (e.g., those that are just outside the boundary of internal affairs), the regu-
latory power should belong to the state corporate law. This is an important policy issue that is
beyond the scope of this paper.
126 91 A.3d 552 (Del. 2014). In that case, plaintiffs brought both corporate and antitrust
claims against the defendant non-profit corporation and the Delaware Supreme Court upheld
the facial validity of the defendant’s fee-shifting provision (seemingly) against both types of
claims. This opened the door for the possible interpretation that the charter and bylaws can also
regulate non-corporate (in this case, antitrust) claims, the view that the Delaware Supreme
Court relied on in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 2020 Del. LEXIS 100, 23–28 (Del. 2020). See
generally Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation, 104 VA. L. REV. 59 (2018)
(discussing why ATP Tour’s heavily one-sided fee-shifting is undesirable and arguing for more
balanced fee-shifting).
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respect to 1933 Act claims is also a possibility.127 Some may argue that this
is an unattractive byproduct of an expansive notion of corporate contract.
We do not take a view in this Article on mandatory arbitration provisions, in
large part because it is impossible to empirically evaluate their use and effi-
cacy. However, we do emphasize that, at least as a matter of policy, it does
not follow that validating FFPs should also lead to validating mandatory
arbitration provisions that can preclude shareholders from filing lawsuits al-
together. After all, even if FFPs are upheld, shareholders are free to bring
their 1933 Act claims in federal court, either individually or as a class action.
A mandatory individual arbitration provision, on the other hand, not
only denies the shareholders’ right to bring a claim in (any) court, but may
also vitiate their right to bring a class action claim. While charters and by-
laws are not formal “contracts,” even under the Federal Arbitration Act,
mandatory arbitration provisions may be unenforceable when there are
grounds in equity for the revocation of such agreements.128 It is possible that
such provisions in the corporate law context will be viewed as unconsciona-
ble, for example, because shareholders do not typically have the opportunity
to assent to provisions in the charter or bylaws.129 It may be argued that
127 One may go even further. For instance, while the federal courts have the exclusive
jurisdiction with respect to claims arising under the 1934 Exchange Act (claims, for instance,
alleging material misstatement or misrepresentation in a company’s periodic filings), under the
Salzberg reasoning, such claims can be thought of as also belonging to the “intra-corporate
affairs” and be regulated through charters and bylaws. For instance, a charter or a bylaw
provision may dictate that such claims must be brought only in the federal district court of
Delaware. They may also be inclined to include a fee-shifting provision. It is not entirely clear
whether either of these will be in violation of PSLRA. Corporations may attempt to regulate
other non-corporate and non-securities claims as well. For instance, in ATP Tour, the plaintiffs
brought an antitrust claim against the defendant corporation. To the extent that such a claim
relates to the matter between the corporation and its shareholders, one could conceive of a
similar charter or a bylaw provision. Whether or not the law should allow corporations to
dictate the forum (or impose fee-shifting) on issues that are not “internal” to the corporation
raises more fundamental policy questions.
128 Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act permits arbitration agreements to be declared
unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invali-
dated by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S. 681, 687 (1996); see also Perry v. Thomas,
482 U. S. 483, 492–93 n.9 (1987). An important point to note here is that it is not entirely clear
that the Federal Arbitration Act will apply to charters and bylaws, since charters and bylaws
are technically not “contracts” under the Act. Even in earlier cases, such as Boilermakers and
ATP Tour, the Delaware courts did not hold that charters and bylaws are contracts. If charters
and bylaws are construed as contracts, then even if a corporation were to adopt a mandatory
arbitration provision in its organizational document, such a clause will be honored under the
Federal Arbitration Act. See Ann Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration
Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO L.J. 583 (2016).
129 See, e.g., Fisch, infra note 136, at 377 (“courts should engage in greater scrutiny of R
board-adopted bylaws because shareholders may be unable to remove those bylaws them-
selves”); Hershkoff & Kahan, infra note 136 (arguing that forum selection clauses that lack R
any shareholder consent, or even meaningful consent, should not be enforced). If the directors
were to adopt a mandatory arbitration provision without specific approval from the sharehold-
ers, the claim of unconscionability or even “bad faith” modification of bylaws becomes
stronger. See, e.g., Choi & Min, supra note 4(discussing how unilateral adoption of bylaw R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\10-2\HLB202.txt unknown Seq: 34  3-AUG-20 8:06
416 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 10
relinquishing the right to sue altogether cannot be effected without express
consent. Thus, the validity of mandatory arbitration provisions requires a
separate analysis, and does not immediately follow from validating FFPs.
B. The Boundaries of Internal Affairs
The second issue is whether a 1933 Act claim can be treated as an
“internal” corporate claim. Under DGCL §115, “internal corporate claims”
are claims “that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or former
director or officer or stockholder in such capacity. . .”130 While the statutory
provision offers a useful starting point in thinking about the boundaries of
“internal corporate claims,” it presumably does not override the existing
case-law-based doctrine. As mentioned earlier, Boilermakers makes an im-
portant distinction between “internal” and “external” claims. However, the
distinction made in Boilermakers was not so exact so as to exclude any
claim under federal law. The main distinction relied on in Boilermakers was
between the rights of stockholders, which are governed by the charter and
bylaws, and the rights of third parties, which are not. As stated in
Boilermakers:
the bylaws would be regulating external matters if the board
adopted a bylaw that purported to bind a plaintiff, even a stock-
holder plaintiff, who sought to bring a tort claim against the com-
pany based on a personal injury she suffered that occurred on the
company’s premises or a contract claim based on a commercial
contract with the corporation.131
The decision in Sciabacucchi applies this analysis to claims under the 1933
Act by stating:
For purposes of the analysis in Boilermakers, a 1933 Act claim
resembles a tort or contract claim brought by a third-party plaintiff
who was not a stockholder at the time the claim arose. At best for
the defendants, a 1933 Act claim resembles a tort or contract claim
brought by a plaintiff who happens also to be a stockholder, but
provisions can run afoul of the contract law requirement of good faith modification). We ac-
knowledge however that in practice, federal courts tend to affirm arbitration provisions, and
only rarely hold them to be unconscionable. See Diane P. Wood, The Brave New World of
Arbitration, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 383 (2003).
130 One expansive notion of an “internal corporate claim” is to argue that, for instance,
when directors or officers make material misrepresentation or material omission in the IPO
documents and this allows stockholders to bring a 1933 Act claim, that claim is “based upon”
the directors’ or officers’ violation of duty. See Grundfest, supra note 39, at 56–62 (arguing
that because, among others, Section 11 claims “always implicate the care with which directors
reviewed the allegedly defective registration statement,” they are “internal” claims).
131 See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 952.
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under circumstances where stockholder status is incidental to the
claim.132
That is, according to the court, a stockholder acts in two capacities: first, as a
purchaser with respect to the initial purchase of its shares, and second, as a
stockholder after that purchase.133 A claim under the 1933 Act relates to the
first capacity only.
However, is a 1933 Act claim similar to a claim in tort or a claim in
contract? It is true that at the time an investor purchases a share, the investor
is not yet a stockowner. However, when the purchased security is a share,
the right to sue under the 1933 Act relates directly to the investor’s status as
a stockholder.134 The claimant would not be able to sue at all if they did not
become a shareholder, and the lawsuit will likely have a direct effect on the
relationship between shareholders and the corporation.135 Consistent with
this reasoning, a more flexible version of the internal affairs doctrine would
govern the claims that are raised by shareholders (qua shareholders) against
the corporation, regardless of whether the claim is based on federal or state
law, so long as they deal with the “internal” relationship between the share-
holders and the corporation. This is buttressed by the fact that the investors
who buy shares in the corporation buy these shares subject to the terms spec-
ified in the charter and bylaws of the corporation, which are (as explained in
Boilermakers) part of the corporate “contract” between the corporation and
stockholders that regulates the “internal” relationship between the share-
holders and the corporation.136 By contrast, a consumer that buys a product
132 Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, 2018 WL 6719718, at *38 (Del. Ch. 2018).
133 See James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law,
64 UCLA L. REV. 116 (2017) (asserting that federal securities law governs the purchase of
stocks by investors, while state corporate law dictates the rights of shareholders as owners of
the corporation).
134 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Does Delaware Law Preclude Mandatory Arbitration of Fed-
eral Securities Claims?, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-otc-shareholderarb/does-delaware-law-preclude-mandatory-arbitration-of-federal-securi-
ties-claims-idUSKCN1NV2JT (quoting Professor Pritchard as saying that “he disagrees with
the . . . argument that federal securities fraud claims do not arise from shareholders’ charter and
bylaw agreements.”).
135 Hypothetically, if the 1933 Act did not exist, an investor who alleged misstatement in
an IPO document could presumably only raise a common law fraud claim, rather than a corpo-
rate law claim. Nonetheless, a charter or bylaw provision that regulates this claim would be
valid, because the claimant is a shareholder, and the claim relates closely to the rights of
shareholders.
136 See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 940. Shareholders are deemed to have inspected the
charter and bylaws as to matters governed by the DGCL, even without contemporaneously
assenting to them when buying shares. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle,
The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and
Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325 (2013). Several scholars have contested the extension of
the contract paradigm to the analysis of corporate charters and bylaws. See, e.g., James D. Cox,
Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 257 (2015); Jill E.
Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 CALIF. L. REV.
372 (2018); Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate
“Contracts”, 93 WASH. L. REV. 265 (2018).
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from a corporation or a tort victim of the corporation presumably is not
bound by any of the provisions of the charter or bylaws,137 and thus, such
claims are truly “external” to the corporation.
Prior decisions from Delaware’s corporate jurisprudence provide sup-
port for this flexible interpretation of the internal affairs doctrine. In
VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc.,138 the Delaware Su-
preme Court held that the internal affairs doctrine “applies to those matters
that pertain to the relationships among or in between the corporation and its
officers, directors, and shareholders.”139 The court saw the internal affairs as
“not . . . only a conflicts of law principle.”140 The court explained that the
doctrine also served a valuable role by prospectively informing directors and
officers about the law that will apply to their actions, and informing share-
holders about the standards to which they can hold corporate executives.141
FFPs similarly regulate the relationship between two parties “internal” to
the corporation: the managers (directors and officers) making disclosure de-
cisions, and the shareholders deciding where to bring a lawsuit based on the
disclosure. The FFPs put both managers and shareholders on notice that a
1933 Act violation will be litigated in a federal district court.
The flexible internal affairs notion is also buttressed by the existing
regulatory framework which already allows overlapping jurisdiction. We
have noted earlier how Delaware corporate law regulates stockholders’ right
to purchase and sell securities and other non-corporate claimants’ rights in
liquidation proceedings. Another important area is with respect to proxy.
The SEC’s Rule 14a-8 (under the 1934 Act) allows companies to exclude
shareholder proposals from their proxy materials if the proposals seek to
influence the outcomes of director elections.142 Under federal law, therefore,
companies can force shareholders wishing to nominate directors to circulate
their own dissident proxy with their slate of candidates. However, in 2009,
Delaware enacted §112 of the DGCL to permit (but not mandate) corpora-
tions to adopt bylaws that allow shareholders to access companies’ proxies
when nominating their own director candidates.143 These bylaws, if adopted,
would seem to modify the company’s ability exclude shareholders’ nominees
from the proxy statement,144 and some practitioners believe that §112
“would appear to preclude an argument” that shareholders’ attempts to influ-
137 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TULANE L. REV. 339,
370 (2018) (explaining that tort victims and consumers are “external” to the corporation since
they are unlikely to opportunistically move to another jurisdiction with more lenient product
liability or tort laws).
138 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005).
139 Id. at 1113.
140 Id.
141 See id.
142 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(i)(8) (2018).
143 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 112 (2018).
144 When the SEC tried unsuccessfully to make similar shareholder access to proxy mater-
ials mandatory in 2010, it acknowledged that Section 112 “enable[d] companies to provide in
their governing documents an ability for shareholders to include their director nominees in the
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ence director elections are excludable under Rule 14a-8.145 That is, Dela-
ware’s corporate law seems to facilitate bylaw provisions that modify the
rights of the company under federal law. Extending this framework to the
1933 Act, Delaware courts can conceivably allow bylaw or charter provi-
sions that modify shareholders’ federal rights in bringing 1933 Act claims.
We also note that while it is true that the 1933 Act applies to any secur-
ity—such as publicly-traded debt securities—and therefore the potential
claimants may be bondholders,146 there is no compelling reason to invalidate
FFPs as they apply to shareholders. Foremost, given that DGCL §§102(b)
and 109(b) mention only the rights of the “stockholders,” dictating the fo-
rum for other types of investors, such as debt-holders, through a charter or
bylaws would be inconsistent with the statutory command.147 Furthermore,
Boilermakers explicitly rejected the view that validating a provision implies
that it has broad applicability irrespective of the circumstances, and explic-
itly advocated “judicial reticence to chill corporate freedom by condemning
as invalid a bylaw that is consistent with the board’s statutory and contrac-
tual authority, simply because it might be possible to imagine situations
when the bylaw might operate unreasonably.”148 Consistent with this ap-
proach, even under the more “flexible” conception of internal affairs, it
seems quite persuasive for courts to find that FFPs to apply to shareholders
only.149
company’s proxy materials,” and that such statutes proved that “private ordering is an alterna-
tive to our new rules.” 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,774–75 (Sept. 6, 2010).
145 Robert K. Morris, Reacting to Shareholder Proxy Access Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 5, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/11/
05/reacting-to-shareholder-proxy-access-proposals/.
146 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2018) (defining a “security” in expansive terms); see also Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (stating that [a] note is presumed to be a “secur-
ity”); Sciabacucchi, 2018 WL 6719718, at *17 (“Shares are just one of . . . many types of
securities.”).
147 There is some statutory ambiguity under DGCL §115, however. The section defines
“internal corporate claims” to mean “claims. . .that are based upon a violation of a duty by a
current or former director or officer or stockholder in such capacity. . .” With respect to debt-
holders, one could plausibly argue that the directors and officers (and possibly also the stock-
holders) have a contractual “duty” (as opposed to fiduciary duty) to them and, hence, when
debt-holders bring a breach of contract (indenture or credit agreement) claim against them, this
can qualify as an “internal corporate claim.”
148 Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 949 n.62.
149 This approach is consistent with a broader understanding of the internal affairs doctrine
as being closely intertwined with the shareholder primacy norm that characterizes American
corporate law. See Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Centros, California’s “Women on
Boards” Statute and the Scope of Regulatory Competition, EUR. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 10). The paradigm is based on the idea that firms, through their managers, will
choose the laws and provisions that maximize the value of these firms because efficient mar-
kets will price these governance structures, and managers have the legal duty to maximize firm
value. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). Thus, rules
designed to address issues of general social welfare and the rights of stakeholders fall outside
the internal affairs doctrine. On the other hand, rules that facilitate shareholder wealth may be
viewed as related to the internal affairs of the corporation. See Fisch & Davidoff, “Women on
Boards,” at 11. To the extent that it suggests that FFPs enhance shareholder value, the empiri-
cal analysis is consistent with the internal affairs doctrine permitting such provisions.
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We acknowledge that the internal affairs doctrine is constrained by fed-
eral laws that preempt state laws.150 At the same time, however, validating
FFPs in charters and bylaws is consistent with federal courts’ broad defer-
ence to “contractual” provisions that regulate the resolution of legal dis-
putes. In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,151 the Supreme Court held that
forum selection clauses in commercial agreements are valid, provided that
they are “unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining
power,”152 and that the provisions “should be enforced unless enforcement is
shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable.”153 There is little reason to
believe that restricting claims under the 1933 Act to federal courts would be
wrongful under the Bremen test. While charters and bylaws are technically
not “contracts,” when validating exclusive forum bylaws with respect to
breach of fiduciary duty claims, the Boilermakers court heavily relied on the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bremen.154 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has taken a deferential approach to forum selection, even in the context of
the 1933 Act. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,155
the Court held that brokerage firms can, through a mandatory arbitration
clause in a customer agreement, compel investors to arbitrate 1933 Act
claims under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Rodriguez opinion further
stated that “the right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice of
courts are not . . . essential features of [the 1933 Act].”156 Unlike arbitration
150 There is dictum in Sciabacucchi that suggests that FFPs are preempted by federal law.
See Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, 2018 WL 6719718, at *23 (Del. Ch. 2018) (“[B]ecause the
Federal Forum Provisions conflict with the forum alternatives that the 1933 Act permits, the
provisions could be preempted.”). However, Delaware courts have interpreted Supreme Court
precedent to conclude that applications of the internal affairs doctrine are not preempted by
federal law so long as Delaware is simply regulating the affairs of corporations incorporated in
the state. See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 n.12 (Del. 1987) (stating “a state
does not violate the commerce clause, notwithstanding heavy burdens imposed upon interstate
commerce, if a state is merely regulating the internal affairs of its own corporations”) (citing
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)) (emphasis added). Therefore,
even if the companies using FFPs are headquartered in California and other states, so long as
they are incorporated in Delaware, the flexible approach to the internal affairs doctrine sug-
gests that Delaware corporate law can regulate these clauses.
151 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
152 Id. at 12.
153 Id. at 10. The Delaware Supreme Court has also closely conformed to the Bremen
decision, holding that “where contracting parties have expressly agreed upon a legally en-
forceable forum selection clause, a court should honor the parties’ contract and enforce the
clause.” Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1145 (Del. 2010).
154 See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 957–58.
155 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
156 Id. at 481. Specifically, the court held that an arbitration agreement does not contra-
vene Section 14 of the 1933 Act, which forbids any agreements “to waive compliance with
any provision” of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 77n (2018)). The Supreme Court has taken an equally
deferential approach with respect to agreements to arbitrate claims individually in other con-
texts, such as claims for breach of consumer contracts, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333 (2011), and even violating anti-trust laws, American Express Co. v. Italian Col-
ors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). Note that in considering arbitration agreements, the court
applies the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified
as amended in 9 U.S.C.), which established a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
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agreements, FFPs do not deny claimants the right to sue in court, and thus as
long as the adoption of an FFP is not the result of fraud or overweening
bargaining power, it is likely to be viewed favorably by federal courts. Fur-
thermore, at least under the Delaware jurisprudence, charters and bylaws are
not formally considered as “contracts,” thereby putting them potentially out
of the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act.157
Before we conclude, one implication of adopting a more flexible con-
ception of “internal affairs” is that FFPs that are contained in charters and
bylaws will now be subject to DGCL §115, which states, in relevant part:
“[t]he certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require . . . that any or
all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or
all of the courts in this State, and no provision of the certificate of incorpora-
tion or the bylaws may prohibit bringing such claims in the courts of this
State.” While it is not entirely clear what the phrase “the courts of this
State” means, one can make a fairly persuasive argument that the phrase
likely includes both the federal and state courts of Delaware.158 If an FFP
were to dictate a federal forum that resides outside of Delaware, for instance,
one can argue that such an FFP would be inconsistent with the statute. A
more consistent approach, on the other hand, would allow a plaintiff to bring
(or at least not prohibit a plaintiff from bringing) a 1933 Act claim in a
Delaware federal district court.159 Furthermore, unlike the previous, more
expansive construction of DGCL §102(b), under the more flexible internal
affairs doctrine, a forum provision for 1933 Act claims that dictates any non-
Delaware (either federal or state) forum, including mandatory arbitration
provisions, would be invalid. A fee-shifting provision also will not be al-
lowed under DGCL §§102(f) and 109(b). To the extent that the Delaware
legislature deemed disallowing non-Delaware forum or fee-shifting provi-
sions important, the flexible internal affairs approach may be more consis-
tent with that legislative intent.
CONCLUSION
Federal forum provisions constitute a unique legal device at the inter-
section of corporate and federal securities laws. These provisions have at-
tracted criticism from both academics and practitioners, in large part because
ments, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
157 See supra note 128 for a more detailed discussion. R
158 See Grundfest, supra note 39, at 70–72 (parsing the statutory language of DGCL §115
and arguing that “in the courts of this State” includes federal district court in Delaware).
159 In Sciabacucchi, the defendant companies, Roku, Stitch Fix, and Blue Apron, adopted
charter provisions which stated, in relevant part: “the federal district courts of the United
States of America shall be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any complaint asserting a
cause of action arising under the Securities Act of 1933.” See Sciabacucchi at 13–14. Since
such charter (or bylaw) provision does not “prohibit” plaintiffs from bringing a 1933 Act
claim in the Delaware federal district court, assuming that the phrase “the courts of this State”
includes the Delaware federal district court, the provision will be consistent with DGCL §115.
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they constitute a private ordering device that customizes (and restricts) rights
conferred on shareholders by Congress and interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Cyan. On the other side of the spectrum, proponents of federal
forum provisions have argued that they may serve a useful role in curbing
excessive litigation and may direct litigation to its most natural forum, fed-
eral courts, where the cases will be subject to the various procedural and
substantive rules under the PSLRA and SLUSA that Congress thought desir-
able for federal securities litigation.
The Article has attempted to shed some light on this issue through em-
pirical analysis. Our findings, while not conclusive, are consistent with the
more benign and positive view of FFPs. The analysis has shown that the
firms that adopt them tend to be firms that are often the target of shareholder
lawsuits, but they do not appear to be the firms that are susceptible to high
agency costs. Moreover, the Sciabacucchi decision that validated these pro-
visions is associated with a large negative stock price effect on the firms that
had previously adopted FFPs. This analysis thus suggests that there may be
good policy-based reasons to support the Delaware Supreme Court’s reversal
of Sciabacucchi, or for Congress to create exclusive federal jurisdiction for
1933 Act claims.
Finally, we argue that validating FFPs does not necessarily interfere
with the existing corporate law doctrines (especially the internal affairs doc-
trine) and Delaware corporate law, and also is broadly consistent with the
approach that federal courts have taken with respect to forum selection
clauses. The question of whether to allow FFPs in corporate charters and
bylaws raises two important issues in corporate law: to what extent we can
treat charters and bylaws as a “contract” between corporations and share-
holders, and the boundaries of the internal affairs doctrine. We have sug-
gested two alternative approaches to allowing FFPs in charters and bylaws:
either by expanding the set of subject matters that can be dealt with in char-
ters and bylaws (the approach taken by the Delaware Supreme Court in Salz-
berg v. Sciabacucchi), or adopting a more “flexible” conception of the
internal affairs doctrine. We have suggested how the latter approach can po-
tentially better serve shareholders’ interests and may be better in line with
the broader framework of U.S. corporate law.
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES
FIGURE 1: FEDERAL EXCLUSIVE FORUM PROVISIONS AT IPO
FIGURE 2: STOCK RETURNS AROUND THE SCIABACUCCHI DECISION
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FIGURE 3: ABNORMAL RETURNS AROUND THE SCIABACUCCHI DECISION
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APPENDIX B: TABLES
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FIRMS THAT FILED
A REGISTRATION STATEMENT - 2017–2019
 Adopting Firms Non-Adopting Firms  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Mean Median
Std. 
Dev. Obs. Mean Median
Std. 
Dev. Obs. 
t-stats 
(1)-(5) 
IPO Under-pricing 0.232 0.18 0.268 70 0.106 0.017 0.309 357 3.214 
Vulnerable Ind. 0.747 1 0.437 91 0.408 0 0.492 532 6.177 
IPO Proceeds 330.626 126.7 937.714 90 207.365 105 321.495 501 2.292 
Post-Cyan Pre-Sciabacucchi 0.637 1 0.483 91 0.329 0 0.47 532 5.758 
Post- Sciabacucchi 0.176 0 0.383 91 0.199 0 0.4 532 -0.520 
Negative Earning 0.857 1 0.352 91 0.545 1 0.498 532 5.731 
Cash Ratio 0.43 0.341 0.328 89 0.254 0.11 0.302 511 5.029 
VC/PE-Backed IPO 0.813 1 0.392 91 0.32 0 0.467 532 9.529 
Dual-Class Stock 0.198  0 0.401  91 0.31 0 0.463  532 -2.179 
Delaware Inc. 0.956 1 0.206 91 0.528 1 0.5 532 8.047 
California Hdq. 0.516 1 0.502 91 0.148 0 0.356 532 8.521 
Law Firm 0.626 1 0.486 91 0.094 0 0.292 532 14.33 
Age 10.625 9 10.549 80 13.626 7 22.076 356 -1.185 
All variables are defined in Appendix C. Financial variables are recorded for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF IPO FIRMS 1996–2018
 Firms Subject to s.11 Lawsuits Firms Not Subject to s.11 Lawsuits  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Mean Median
Std.  
Dev. Obs. Mean Median 
Std.  
Dev. Obs. 
t-stats 
(1)-(5) 
Vulnerable Ind. 0.598 1 .491 518 0.454 0 0.498 4,174 6.216 
IPO Proceeds 277.266 83.05 1128.871 518 147.894 68.4 446.757 4,174 4.924 
Negative Earnings 0.66 1 0.474 518 0.483 0 0.5 4,174 7.655 
Cash Ratio 0.27 0.196 0.255 516 0.223 0.109 0.259 4,101 3.908 
VC/PE-Backed IPO 0.757 1 0.429 518 0.585 1 0.493 4,174 7.601 
IPO Under-pricing 0.735 0.374 0.992 516 0.17 0.083 0.326 4,084 26.73 
Delaware Inc. 0.78 1 0.415 518 0.663 1 0.473 4,174 5.382 
California Hdq. 0.324 0 0.469 518 0.225 0 0.418 4,174 5.009 
Age 12.763 6 21.076 514 17.195 9 23.171 3,845 -4.115 
All variables are defined in Appendix C. Financial variables are recorded for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
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TABLE 3: PROBABILITY OF SECTION 11 LAWSUITS
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vulnerable Ind. 0.512***
(4.79) 
0.407***
(3.55) 
0.188 
(1.55) 
0.184 
(1.52) 
0.142 
(1.17) 
- Marginal effect 0.0443***
(4.84) 
0.0355***
(3.56) 
0.0152 
(1.55) 
0.0150 
(1.52) 
0.0120 
(1.17) 
Log (IPO 
Proceeds) 
0.396***
(8.32) 
0.426***
(8.56) 
0.374***
(6.88) 
0.375***
(6.86) 
0.445*** 
(7.63) 
- Marginal effect 0.0343***
(8.38) 
0.0371***
(8.68) 
0.0304***
(6.89) 
0.0304***
(6.88) 
0.0376*** 
(7.67) 
Negative 
Earnings  
0.338***
(2.91) 
0.203* 
(1.65) 
0.190 
(1.52) 
0.186 
(1.46) 
- Marginal effect  0.0295***
(2.91) 
0.0165* 
(1.65) 
0.0154 
(1.52) 
0.0158 
(1.46) 
Cash Ratio  0.218 
(1.08) 
-0.266 
(-1.18) 
-0.274 
(-1.21) 
-0.310 
(-1.35) 
- Marginal effect  0.0190 
(1.08) 
-0.0216 
(-1.17) 
-0.0222 
(-1.21) 
-0.0262 
(-1.34) 
VC/PE-Backed 
IPO  
 0.352***
(2.63) 
0.326** 
(2.39) 
0.187 
(1.38) 
- Marginal effect   0.0286***
(2.63) 
0.0264**
(2.39) 
0.0158 
(1.38) 
IPO Under-
pricing  
 1.097***
(9.81) 
1.089***
(9.72) 
1.091*** 
(9.94) 
- Marginal effect   0.0891***
(10.34) 
0.0884***
(10.23) 
0.0922*** 
(10.46) 
Delaware Inc.    0.0972 
(0.75) 
0.00148 
(0.01) 
- Marginal effect    0.00789 
(0.75) 
0.000125 
(0.01) 
California Hdq.    0.0574 
(0.48) 
0.0435 
(0.36) 
- Marginal effect    0.00466 
(0.48) 
0.00368 
(0.36) 
Age    
 -0.00735** 
(-2.15) 
- Marginal effect    
 -0.000621** 
(-2.15) 
Pseudo R-
square 
0.140 0.142 0.193 0.193 0.193 
Observations 4,692 4,617 4,530 4,530 4,279 
The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a firm is subject to a section 11 
lawsuit, and zero otherwise. statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Financial variables are recorded 
for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
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TABLE 4: PROBABILITY OF ADOPTING AN EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL
FORUM PROVISION - 2017–2019
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vulnerable Ind. 1.452***
(5.24) 
0.811** 
(2.26) 
0.504 
(1.39) 
-0.153 
(-0.34) 
-0.0814 
(-0.15) 
- Marginal effect 0.161***
(5.47) 
0.0878**
(2.26) 
0.0504 
(1.39) 
-0.0110 
(-0.34) 
-0.00644 
(-0.15) 
Log (IPO 
Proceeds) 
0.370***
(3.81) 
0.441***
(4.36) 
0.394***
(3.54) 
0.343***
(2.65) 
0.297* 
(1.92) 
- Marginal effect 0.0409***
(3.80) 
0.0477***
(4.37) 
0.0394***
(3.51) 
0.0246***
(2.58) 
0.0235* 
(1.90) 
Post-Cyan Pre-
Sciabacucchi 
1.483***
(4.88) 
1.425***
(4.54) 
1.586***
(4.76) 
1.936***
(5.05) 
2.024*** 
(4.75) 
- Marginal effect 0.164***
(5.04) 
0.154***
(4.87) 
0.159***
(5.28) 
0.139***
(5.89) 
0.160*** 
(6.02) 
Post- 
Sciabacucchi 
0.696* 
(1.80) 
0.648 
(1.62) 
0.729* 
(1.75) 
0.286 
(0.54) 
0.561 
(0.85) 
- Marginal effect 0.0771* 
(1.79) 
0.0702 
(1.62) 
0.0728* 
(1.77) 
0.0205 
(0.54) 
0.0444 
(0.86) 
Negative Earning  1.092***
(2.76) 
0.659 
(1.56) 
0.220 
(0.43) 
0.281 
(0.44) 
- Marginal effect  0.118***
(2.79) 
0.0659 
(1.57) 
0.0158 
(0.44) 
0.0222 
(0.44) 
Cash Ratio  0.962** 
(2.23) 
0.452 
(0.98) 
0.181 
(0.34) 
0.247 
(0.43) 
- Marginal effect  0.104** 
(2.26) 
0.0452 
(0.99) 
0.0130 
(0.34) 
0.0196 
(0.43) 
VC/PE-Backed 
IPO 
  1.435***
(4.26) 
0.943** 
(2.47) 
0.910** 
(1.98) 
- Marginal effect   0.144***
(4.39) 
0.0676**
(2.47) 
0.0720** 
(1.99) 
Dual-Class Stock   -0.867**
(-2.52) 
-0.531 
(-1.31) 
-0.470 
(-1.01) 
- Marginal effect   -0.0867**
(-2.57) 
-0.0381 
(-1.27) 
-0.0372 
(-0.99) 
Delaware Inc.    2.545***
(3.77) 
2.483*** 
(3.19) 
- Marginal effect    0.182***
(4.09) 
0.197*** 
(3.67) 
California Hdq.    1.145***
(3.01) 
1.143*** 
(2.68) 
- Marginal effect    0.0821***
(3.04) 
0.0905*** 
(2.68) 
Law firm    2.146***
(5.85) 
2.292*** 
(5.82) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Marginal Effect    0.154***
(7.48) 
0.181*** 
(8.02) 
Age     -0.124 
(-0.65) 
- Marginal effect     -0.00982 
(-0.66) 
Pseudo R-square 0.156 0.188 0.248 0.452 0.461 
Observations 591 570 570 570 420 
The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a firm adopted a federal exclusive 
forum provision, and zero otherwise. t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Financial variables are recorded 
for the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
TABLE 5: PROBABILITY OF ADOPTING AN EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL FORUM
PROVISION AND LITIGATION PROBABILITY - 2018–2019
 (1) (2) (3) 
Litigation Probability 10.14*** 
(3.56) 
13.76*** 
(4.11) 
11.24*** 
(3.05) 
- Marginal effect 1.516*** 
(3.65) 
1.948*** 
(4.30) 
1.201*** 
(3.04) 
Post-Cyan Pre- Sciabacucchi 2.339*** 
(5.54) 
2.714*** 
(5.45) 
2.499*** 
(4.70) 
- Marginal effect 0.350*** 
(6.38) 
0.384*** 
(6.63) 
0.267*** 
(5.32) 
Dual-Class Stock  -1.320*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.927**  
(-2.10) 
- Marginal effect  -0.187*** 
(-3.46) 
-0.0991**  
(-2.10) 
Law Firm   2.503*** 
(6.43) 
- Marginal effect   0.267*** 
(9.64) 
Pseudo R-square 0.123 0.166 0.326 
Observations 302 302 302 
The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a firm adopted a federal 
exclusive forum provision, and zero otherwise. t statistics based on bootstrap 
standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All 
variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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TABLE 6: THE STOCK PRICE EFFECT OF SCIABACUCCHI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AR 
(0) 
CAR 
(0,+1) 
CAR 
(0,+2) 
CAR 
(-1,+1) 
CAR 
(-2,+2) 
CAR
(-7,-3) 
CAR 
(+3,+7) 
-1.823* 
(-1.81) 
-3.150*** 
(-2.68) 
-4.731***
(-3.23) 
-4.181***
(-2.89) 
-7.426***
(-3.82) 
-1.171
(-0.91) 
1.781 
(1.15) 
N=65.  statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
TABLE 7: THE STOCK PRICE EFFECT OF SCIABACUCCHI
USING PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Event  
Window 
0 
Event  
Window
(0,+1) 
Event  
Window
(0,+2) 
Event  
Window
(-1,+1) 
Event  
Window
(-2,+2) 
Event  
Window 
(-2,+2) 
AR -1.829** 
(-2.41) 
-1.570***
(-2.91) 
-1.572***
(-3.46) 
-1.385***
(-3.17) 
-1.468***
(-4.21) 
-1.451*** 
(-4.27) 
AR (-3,-7)      -0.243 
(-0.73) 
AR (+3,+7)      0.333 
(1.01) 
CAR -1.829** 
(-2.41) 
-3.14***
(-4.12) 
-4.716***
(-5.99) 
-4.155***
(-5.49) 
-7.34***
(-9.41) 
-7.255*** 
(-9.55) 
Observations 121 122 123 123 125 135 
N=65.  statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\10-2\HLB202.txt unknown Seq: 48  3-AUG-20 8:06
430 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 10
TABLE 8: THE STOCK PRICE EFFECT OF SCIABACUCCHI BY FIRM TYPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AR 
(0) 
CAR 
(0,+1) 
CAR 
(0,+2) 
CAR 
(-1,+1) 
CAR 
(-2,+2) 
CAR 
(-7,-3) 
CAR 
(+3,+7) 
Panel A: Firms from Industries that are Prone to Litigation (N = 47) 
-2.412* 
(-2.00) 
-3.686*** 
(-2.97) 
-5.255***
(-3.32) 
-4.877***
(-3.06) 
-9.085***
(-4.51) 
-0.811
(-0.49) 
1.589 
(0.78) 
Panel B: Federal Forum Provision in the Charter (N = 42) 
-1.371 
(-1.40) 
-2.381* 
(-1.84) 
-4.482***
(-2.74) 
-2.897* 
(-1.74) 
-6.113***
(-2.72) 
-2.732
(-1.61) 
0.871 
(0.40) 
Panel C: IPO Firms (N = 54) 
-2.652** 
(-2.31) 
-3.947*** 
(-2.94) 
-5.875***
(-3.54) 
-4.870***
(-2.93) 
-8.404***
(-3.80) 
-2.262
(-1.63) 
1.233 
(0.74) 
Panel D: Excluding Firms with Dual-Class Stock post IPO (N = 41) 
-2.999**  
(-2.05)  
-4.555**  
(-2.70)  
-6.009***
(-2.89)  
-6.126***
(-3.16)  
-8.528***
(-3.14)  
-1.534 
(-1.12) 
0.506  
(0.30)  
Panel E: Firms that Under-priced their Securities at the IPO (N = 46) 
-1.541* 
(-1.75) 
-2.874** 
(-2.31) 
-5.243***
(-3.28) 
-3.615**
(-2.20) 
-7.567***
(-3.34) 
-2.797*
(-1.97) 
2.012 
(1.19) 
Panel F: Firms with a Share Price Higher than the IPO Price before Sciabacucchi 
(N = 28) 
-2.384** 
(-2.34) 
-2.968** 
(-2.23) 
-5.256***
(-3.11) 
-3.133* 
(-1.72) 
-9.019***
(-4.11) 
-1.907
(-0.91) 
0.793 
(0.53) 
 statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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TABLE 9: THE STOCK PRICE EFFECT OF SCIABACUCCHI USING
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS BY FIRM TYPE
Panel A: Firms from Industries that are Prone to Litigation (N = 47) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Event  
Window 
0 
Event  
Window
(0,+1) 
Event  
Window
(0,+2) 
Event  
Window
(-1,+1) 
Event  
Window
(-2,+2) 
Event  
Window 
(-2,+2) 
AR -2.405** 
(-2.56) 
-1.823***
(-2.74) 
-1.732***
(-3.08) 
-1.600***
(-2.96) 
-1.790***
(-4.13) 
-1.753*** 
(-4.15) 
AR (-3,-7)      -0.160 
(-0.39) 
AR (+3,+7)      0.304 
(0.74) 
CAR -2.405** 
(-2.56) 
-3.646***
(-3.875) 
-5.196***
(-5.335) 
-4.800***
(-5.127) 
-8.950***
(-9.235) 
-8.765*** 
(-9.280) 
Panel B: Federal Forum Provision in the Charter (N = 42) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Event  
Window 
0 
Event  
Window
(0,+1) 
Event  
Window
(0,+2) 
Event  
Window
(-1,+1) 
Event  
Window
(-2,+2) 
Event  
Window 
(-2,+2) 
AR -1.391* 
(-1.76) 
-1.183**
(-2.11) 
-1.476***
(-3.12) 
-0.957**
(-2.11) 
-1.180***
(-3.23) 
-1.182*** 
(-3.26) 
AR (-3,-7)      -0.552 
(-1.57) 
AR (+3,+7)      0.136 
(0.39) 
CAR -1.391* 
(-1.76) 
-2.366***
(-2.98) 
-4.428***
(-5.40) 
-2.871***
(-3.66) 
-5.9***
(-7.22) 
-5.91*** 
(-7.29) 
Panel C: IPO Firms (N = 54) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Event  
Window 
0 
Event  
Window
(0,+1) 
Event  
Window
(0,+2) 
Event  
Window
(-1,+1) 
Event  
Window
(-2,+2) 
Event  
Window 
(-2,+2) 
AR -2.661*** 
(-3.05) 
-1.950***
(-3.14) 
-1.938***
(-3.71) 
-1.590***
(-3.15) 
-1.631***
(-4.05) 
-1.580*** 
(-4.03) 
AR (-3,-7)      -0.421 
(-1.10) 
AR (+3,+7)      0.199 
(0.52) 
CAR -2.661*** 
(-3.05) 
-3.9***
(-4.44) 
-5.814***
(-6.43) 
-4.77***
(-5.46) 
-8.155***
(-9.06) 
-7.9*** 
(-9.01) 
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Panel D: Excluding Firms with Dual-Class Stock post IPO (N = 41) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Event  
Window 
0 
Event  
Window
(0,+1) 
Event  
Window
(0,+2) 
Event  
Window
(-1,+1) 
Event  
Window
(-2,+2) 
Event  
Window 
(-2,+2) 
AR -2.999*** 
(-3.36)  
-2.262***
(-3.55)  
-2.004***
(-3.73)  
-2.015***
(-3.90)  
-1.687***
(-4.07)  
-1.592*** 
(-3.93)  
AR (-3,-7) 
     
-0.266 
(-0.68)  
AR (+3,+7) 
     
0.0395 
(0.10) 
CAR -2.999*** 
(-3.36)  
-4.524***
(-5.020) 
-6.012***
(-6.461) 
-6.045***
(-6.755) 
-8.435***
(-9.101) 
-7.96*** 
(-8.788) 
Panel E: Firms that Under-priced their Securities at the IPO (N = 46) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Event  
Window 
0 
Event  
Window
(0,+1) 
Event  
Window
(0,+2) 
Event  
Window
(-1,+1) 
Event  
Window
(-2,+2) 
Event  
Window 
(-2,+2) 
AR -1.556* 
(-1.69) 
-1.423**
(-2.18) 
-1.725***
(-3.12) 
-1.185**
(-2.24) 
-1.463***
(-3.44) 
-1.366*** 
(-3.25) 
AR (-3,-7)      -0.527 
(-1.29) 
AR (+3,+7)      0.339 
(0.83) 
CAR -1.556* 
(-1.69) 
-2.846***
(-3.083) 
-5.175***
(-5.404) 
-3.555***
(-3.880) 
-7.315***
(-7.692) 
-6.830*** 
(-7.267) 
Panel F: Firms with a Share Price Higher than the IPO Price before Sciabacucchi 
(N = 28) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Event  
Window 
0 
Event  
Window
(0,+1) 
Event  
Window
(0,+2) 
Event  
Window
(-1,+1) 
Event  
Window
(-2,+2) 
Event  
Window 
(-2,+2) 
AR -2.381** 
(-2.12) 
-1.449*
(-1.81) 
-1.713**
(-2.54) 
-0.983 
(-1.51) 
-1.722***
(-3.26) 
-1.723*** 
(-3.33) 
AR (-3,-7)      -0.328 
(-0.65) 
AR (+3,+7)      0.177 
(0.35) 
CAR -2.381** 
(-2.12) 
-2.898**
(-2.560) 
-5.139***
(-4.399) 
-2.949***
(-2.615) 
-8.61***
(-7.290) 
-8.615*** 
(-7.446) 
Observations 121 122 123 123 125 135 
 statistics in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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APPENDIX C: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Variable Description Source 
Age Firm age Jay Ritter 
website 
Delaware 
Incorporated 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm is 
incorporated in Delaware 
Compustat, 
Manual 
checks 
California 
Hdq. 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm is 
headquartered in California 
Compustat, 
Manual 
checks 
Vulnerable 
Industry 
An indicator equal to 1 if a firm’s Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code is 
between 2833–2836 (Biotechnology), 3570–
3577 (Computer Hardware), 3600–3674 
(Electronics), 5200–5961 (Retail), and 7370–
7374 (Computer Software) 
Compustat 
IPO Proceeds The proceeds of the IPO exclusive of 
overallotment options 
SDC 
IPO Under-
pricing 
(Closing price on the first trading day of 
IPO offer price) / offer price. 
SDC, CRSP 
Dual-Class 
Stock 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firm if 
following the IPO the firm is a dual class 
stock firm 
SEC Edgar 
(manual 
checks) 
VC/PE 
Backed IPO 
An indicator equal to 1 if the IPO is backed 
by a venture capital investor or a private 
equity firm 
SDC 
Negative 
Earning 
An indicator equal to 1 if the firms’ EBITDA 
or Net Income is smaller than zero. EBITDA 
is the the sum of sales minus cost of goods 
sold minus selling, general and 
administrative expenses. Net income is the 
fiscal year income or loss reported by a 
company after subtracting expenses and 
losses from all revenues and gains. 
Compustat 
Cash Ratio The firm’s level of cash in $ millions at the 
end of the fiscal year divided by book value 
of assets. 
Compustat 
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Variable Description Source 
Pre-Cyan An indicator equal to 1 if the IPO took place 
during the period starting January 1, 2017 
and ending March 20, 2018 (when Cyan was 
decided). 
SDC 
Post-Cyan 
Pre- 
Sciabacucchi 
An indicator equal to 1 if the IPO took place 
during the period starting March 20, 2018 
(when Cyan was decided) and ending on 
December 19, 2018 (when Sciabacucchi was 
decided). 
SDC 
Post- 
Sciabacucchi 
An indicator equal to 1 if the IPO took place 
after December 19, 2018 (when 
Sciabacucchi was decided). 
SDC 
Law Firm An indicator equal to 1 if the firm retained 
one of three law firms: Cooley, Godwin 
Procter and Wilson Sonsini. 
SEC Edgar 
(manual 
checks) 
